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THE SMALL FIRM EXEMPTION AND THE
SINGLE EMPLOYER DOCTRINE IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
RICHARD CARLSONt
INTRODUCTION
Laws prohibiting discrimination in employment often make
an exception for the small firm. Title VII,1 which is the model for
many other federal and state discrimination laws, sets a
threshold for employer coverage at fifteen employees. 2 A firm
employing fewer employees is exempt. As long as it employs no
more than fourteen, it can refuse to hire women, Moslems, or
disabled persons, and it will not be in violation of federal
discrimination law.3 If it employs as many as nineteen, but no
more, it can terminate and refuse to hire anyone over the age of
forty. 4
The practice of exempting small firms from employment laws
began long before Title VII. Early occupational safety laws 5 and
t Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law; J.D., University of Georgia;
B.A., Wake Forest University.
1 'Title VII," as used in this article, means Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
2 Id. § 2000e(b).
3 Title VII prohibits discrimination with respect to race, color, national origin,
religion, or sex, and the small employer exemption is the same in every case. With
regard to race discrimination, however, another federal law undermines the
effectiveness of a small employer defense. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, popularly
known as § 1981, prohibits race discrimination without regard to the size of the
employer. See id. § 1981.
Disability discrimination in employment is prohibited by a separate law, Title I
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, id. §§ 12111-12117.
4 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000),
defines "employer" as person employing at least twenty employees. Id. § 630(b).
5 See St. Louis Consol. Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U.S. 203, 208 (1902) (rejecting an
equal protection challenge against a mine inspection law exempting mines
employing no more than five employees); McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 551-52
(1909) (rejecting a similar challenge against a law exempting mines with fewer than
ten employees).
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workers' compensation laws typically exempted small firms.6
New Deal-era laws such as the Wagner Act 7 and Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 ('TLSA')8 originally lacked small firm
exemptions, but amendments and administrative practices
created protective niches for small firms.9 As a result, an exempt
small firm can pay less than the statutory minimum wage, refuse
to pay overtime rates, discharge union supporters, and reject
collective bargaining regardless of the wishes of its employees. 10
The most popular explanation for these exemptions is that a
small firm might be overwhelmed by the burden of compliance."
The exemption, however, relieves only the smallest of the small.
An exempt firm is a fraction of the size that could qualify as
small for many other regulatory or statistical purposes. The
Small Business Administration, for example, regards a firm
employing up to 500 employees as "small,"'2 but under this
standard a firm could be more than thirty times too large to be
exempt from Title VII. Exempt firms, therefore, tend to be the
sort that provide self-employment as much as profits for their
6 See, e.g., Middleton v. Tex. Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152, 155-57 (1919)
(rejecting an equal protection challenge against a workers' compensation law that
exempted small firms); Sayles v. Foley, 96 A. 340, 344, 349 (R.I. 1916) (upholding a
similar exemption).
7 Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
169 (2000)).
s Pub. L. No. 718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219 (2000)).
9 See infra text accompanying notes 141-156.
1o State laws sometimes fill gaps in the coverage of federal laws, but many state
laws incorporate the same exemptions and leave the same small employers outside
the scope of regulation. See, e.g., TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.002 (Vernon 2004)
(defining "employer" as "a person ... who has 15 or more employees" for purposes of
the Texas law against employment discrimination).
Even common law tort claims that might ordinarily apply to any employer
regardless of size might be preempted by a statute that suggests a legislative intent
to exempt small employers from liability for facts or circumstances addressed by the
statute. See, e.g., Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 61 P.3d 989, 992-93 (Utah 2002) (tort claim
based on small employer's alleged discrimination barred by statute that exempted
small employers from prohibition against discrimination).
11 See, e.g., Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440,
446-47 (2003) (noting that congressional intent to spare small firms from the high
cost of compliance must be respected).
i2 See U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., TABLE OF SMALL BUSINESS SIZE STANDARDS
MATCHED TO NORTH AMERICAN INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM CODES (2006),
available at http://www.sba.gov/size/sizetable2002.pdf; see also CHARLES BROWN,
JAMES HAMILTON & JAMES MEDOFF, EMPLOYERS LARGE AND SMALL, 8-9 (1990)
(noting that 500 employees is the cut-off most often used by the federal government
when classifying large and small businesses).
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owners. Nearly all of the congressional debates that preceded
enactment of the major employment laws with small firm
exemptions were animated with references to "corner" stores,
entrepreneurs working out of their garage, family-owned retail
and service operations, and other independent business people
struggling to provide work for themselves as well as jobs for
others despite stifling government regulation. 13 But legislative
favoritism for small firms has important implications for the
effectiveness of federal labor policy. Firms small enough to be
exempt from Title VII employ more than 19 million employees-
equal to the entire population of the State of New York or more
than sixteen percent of the national workforce. 14 The exemption
may be one reason why small firms are much less likely than
larger firms to hire a representative number of black
employees.1 5 According to one recent study, blacks constitute
13.3% of the workforces of employers of more than 500
employees, but only 7.9% of the workforces of fewer than ten
employees.1 6 These figures might obscure the real situation if, as
13 See BROWN, HAMILTON & MEDOFF, supra note 12, at 4-7, 65-74, 87 (tracing
populist support for small businesses in America and the accompanying political
influence); Marc Linder, The Small-Business Exemption Under the Fair Labor
Standards Act: The "Original" Accumulation of Capital and the Inversion of
Industrial Policy, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 403, 454-58 (1998); see also infra text
accompanying notes 239-242, 283-284.
14 See Brian Headd, The Characteristics of Small-Business Employees,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Apr. 2000, at 13, 14 (using 1998 data). The actual number of
employees employed by exempt small firms, and their share of the national
workforce, is probably significantly greater. The number reported in Mr. Headd's
article is for employers employing fewer than ten employees, but Title VII exempts
employers employing fewer than fifteen employees.
15 See Harry J. Holzer, Why Do Small Establishments Hire Fewer Blacks Than
Large Ones? (Mich. State Univ. Dep't of Econ., Inst. for Research on Poverty,
Discussion Paper No. 1119-97, 1997), available at http://www.irp.wisc.edu
/publications/dps/pdfs/dp11997.pdf. According to Holzer's research, a small firm of
fewer than fifteen employees has a .119 probability that the last hire was black. Id.
at 5. The probability rises to. 145 if the firm's workforce is in the fifteen to forty-nine
range (within range of Title VII coverage). Id. The probability rises even higher, to
.242, when the firm's workforce reaches the range of fifty to ninety-nine. Id. The
probability does not increase, and actually declines somewhat, after the workforce
exceeds 100, which is the point at which many firms become subject to the EEO-i
filing requirement. Id.; see 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7 (2004); see also BROWN, HAMILTON &
MEDOFF, supra note 12, at 86 (describing data from 1986 indicating that minority
employment expanded much more rapidly in firms subject to Equal Employment
Opportunity reporting requirements).
16 See Headd, supra note 14, at 14. Many of the "small" firms in this study were
large enough to qualify as "employers" under Title VII, which suggests the
possibility that Title VII coverage is not the only reason why small firms are less
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some observers have suggested, small business owners of all
races tend to discriminate in favor of their own race, so that
minority employees in the small firm sector are
disproportionately employed by minority businesses. 17 Small
firms might be much less diverse than large ones.
The right to claim the small firm exemption-and with it an
affirmative defense against a charge of discrimination-is an
important advantage for firms that qualify, and a
disappointment for their applicants and employees. Not
surprisingly, the issue of small firm status is frequently
contested in employment discrimination cases, even though the
test for exemption-a headcount of employees-might seem to be
simple and straightforward. Sometimes there are issues about
who counts as an employee, especially if the employer has
delegated a substantial amount of work to 'Independent
contractors,"18 '"partners,"' 9 or other putative non-employees. In
other cases there are issues about what entity or set of entities
likely to hire blacks. Other studies, however, show a distinct increase in the
probability that an employer will hire blacks once the employer surpasses the
threshold for coverage under Title VII. See supra note 15. Other possible factors
include an employer's coverage under EEO-1 reporting requirements (for a firm
employing at least 100) or its coverage under affirmative action and reporting
requirements for federal contractors. See William J. Carrington, Kristin McCue &
Brooks Pierce, Using Establishment Size To Measure the Impact of Title VII and
Affirmative Action, 35 J. HUM. RESOURCES 503, 503-04, 514-15 (2000) (presenting
data that shows Title VII influenced a transition of minority workers to large
employers); Jonathan S. Leonard, The Impact of Affirmative Action Regulation and
Equal Employment Law on Black Employment, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 47, 50-51 (1990)
(noting an increase in minority employment among contractors subject to federal
reporting requirements).
For Hispanics, representation in a workforce is inversely related to firm size,
probably because many small firms are involved in construction and agriculture, and
possibly because firms in these sectors are particularly likely to rely on
undocumented aliens. Nearly thirteen percent of the employees of firms employing
fewer than ten are Hispanic, but only nine percent of employees of firms employing
500 or more are Hispanic. See Headd, supra, at 14, 17.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 299-304.
18 Richard Carlson, Why the Law Still Can't Tell an Employee When It Sees One
and How It Ought To Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 297-98
(2001).
19 See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 442
(2003) (considering the employee status of a professional corporation's physician
shareholders, who also constituted the board of directors). The Court described a
multi-factor test for determining whether owners, partners, directors and officers
are employees, and it remanded the case for application of the test. See id. at 449-
1200 [Vol. 80:1197
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constitute the "employer," a problem that is the main topic of this
article.
This article deals in particular with the problem of the
corporate employer that is part of or consists of a family of
corporations. For most purposes in the law, each corporation is a
single discrete "person," the basic unit as to which legal rights
and duties attach. A corporation is a separate person even if it is
owned entirely by another corporation, or by an individual who
owns other incorporated or unincorporated enterprises. An
"employer" can be a corporation, and in most instances the
corporation and the relevant employer are one and the same. In
some cases, however, the relevant employer is more or less than
a single corporation. For purposes of collective bargaining law or
wage and hour law an employer might be an unincorporated
division of a corporation. 20 On the other hand, a corporation that
is small enough standing alone for an exemption might find itself
swept back into the field of coverage by the "single employer
doctrine,"2 1 which treats affiliated and interrelated corporations
as if they are one entity-a "single employer." Thus, an
exemption for a small employer begs the question: Who is the
employer?
Multiple corporations might be the "employer" under the
single employer doctrine where one corporation owns another, or
where two or more corporations are owned by another entity,
individual or group of individuals. If a plaintiff can prove that
the affiliated corporations also operate to some degree as a single
enterprise, such as by pursuing the same business, serving each
other, and sharing common management and resources, then all
the employees of the multi-corporate enterprise count toward the
threshold for employer coverage, frequently with the result that
none of the affiliated firms is exempt, no matter how small its
own workforce. 22
20 See, e.g., American Federation of Television & Radio Artists, Washington-
Baltimore Local v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 887, 888-89 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (barring a union's
picketing as a "secondary boycott" against a "neutral" division of a corporation).
Similarly, the rights of some employees under the FLSA depend on the revenue
generated by the employing enterprise, which may be a subpart of a larger
corporation. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(r)-(s) (2000); see also The Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act, id. § 2101(a)(1) (defining "employer" as a 'business
enterprise" employing a certain number of employees).
21 For a more detailed history of this doctrine, see infra Part L.A-B.
22 See Murray v. Miner, 74 F.3d 402, 405 (2d Cir. 1996) (resting application of
2006] 1201
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The doctrine is not clearly stated in the text of Title VII or
the other major federal discrimination statutes. When courts
first began to apply the doctrine in employment discrimination
cases in the 1970s, they relied mainly on the example of collective
bargaining law, where the doctrine has had a particularly
vigorous life since the Wagner Act.23 The Wagner Act is no
clearer than Title VII in providing a statutory basis for the single
employer doctrine, but the doctrine seems securely rooted in that
law because the Supreme Court has twice approved the doctrine
in the context of collective bargaining.24 Lately, however, critics
including some judges have questioned the doctrine's application
in employment discrimination cases. They have wondered
whether the single employer doctrine was a mistake from the
start, and some judges have declined to apply the doctrine in
discrimination cases even if they are bound by higher precedent
to apply it in collective bargaining cases.
This article takes a closer look at whether the single
employer doctrine appropriately limits the small firm exemption,
particularly in Title VII and the employment discrimination laws
modeled after Title VII. Part I begins with a brief overview of
the exemption and the single employer doctrine, and with a look
at Judge Richard Posner's opinion in Papa v. Katy Industries,
Inc.25 The consolidated cases in Papa exemplify some typical
settings for the single employer doctrine, and Judge Posner's
opinion presents and clarifies the principal arguments against
the doctrine. Papa remains the leading judicial authority against
the doctrine in employment discrimination law, and it serves as a
convenient starting point for a closer examination of the debate.
Part II examines one set of critics' arguments based on their
description of the origins of the single employer doctrine and its
the doctrine generally on 'the fairness of imposing responsibility on [any] entity that
shares decisionmaking authority with [an] employing entity').
23 See generally Stephen F. Befort, Labor Law and the Double-Breasted
Employer: A Critique of the Single Employer and Alter Ego Doctrines and a Proposed
Reformulation, 1987 WIs. L. REV. 67, 67-70 (1987) ('1A] single employer
determination, coupled with the finding of an appropriate employer-wide bargaining
unit, will result in the extension of both the duty to bargain and the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement. . ... ') (footnote omitted).
24 See S. Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local No. 627, International Union of Operating
Engineers, 425 U.S. 800, 804-05 (1976) (per curiam); Radio & Television Broadcast
Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broad. Serv. of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256
(1965) (per curiam).
25 166 F.3d 937 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1019 (1999).
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specialized function in collective bargaining law. I find as a
historical matter that the single employer doctrine is older and
serves a much wider variety of functions than the critics suppose.
In other words, the examples provided by collective bargaining
law and other employment laws are not so easily dismissed as
precedents for a more general application of the single employer
doctrine. More importantly, the history of the single employer
doctrine was a backdrop for Congress' lively debate about the
small firm exemption in the proceedings that led to Title VII.
Knowing the history of the doctrine is a step toward answering
the question whether Congress intended or expected the doctrine
to limit the small firm exemption.
Next, Part III addresses another set of arguments against
the doctrine based on the perceived lack of support in the text of
the statutes, particularly Title VII, and the assumed lack of other
evidence of Congress' intent to adopt the doctrine. On closer
examination, I find that the congressional debates include at
least some discussion of the single employer doctrine, bolstering
the view that Congress was aware of the likely application of the
doctrine in small firm cases. I also find that Title VII's unusual
definition of "person"2 6 provides an important and probably
purposeful link to a body of pre-existing law that included the
single employer doctrine.
Part IV looks at Judge Posner's argument that application of
the single employer doctrine is contrary to the purpose of the
small firm exemption.27 Judge Posner and other critics have
assumed that the small firm exemption's principle purpose is
economic: to relieve very small firms of the disproportionate
burden of compliance. With respect to this regulatory relief goal,
I find contrary to Judge Posner that there are compelling reasons
not to grant the small firm exemption to many firms that enjoy
the benefits of affiliation with a larger firm or family of firms. I
also find that Congress had other purposes in adopting the
26 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (2000) (defining a "person" as "one or more
individuals, governments, governmental agencies, political subdivisions, labor
unions, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, mutual
companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees,
trustees in cases under title 11, or receivers').
27 Papa, 166 F.3d at 940 ('The purpose is to spare very small firms from the
potentially crushing expense of mastering the intricacies of the antidiscrimination
laws, establishing procedures to assure compliance, and defending against suits
when efforts at compliance fail.').
2006] 1203
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
exemption, including the protection of "personal" relationships in
the small workplace. Proper application of the single employer
doctrine for purposes of statutory coverage makes it more likely
that the exemption will be reserved for firms that have the needs
envisioned by Congress. Part V, my conclusion, offers some
observations about how the test for single employer status might
be better tailored to serve its purpose as a limit on the small firm
exemption.
I. OVERVIEW: THE SMALL FIRM EXEMPTION, THE SINGLE
EMPLOYER DOCTRINE, AND PAPA
A. The Small Firm Exemption
Small firms are exempt from Title VII because the Act
defines "employer" as a "person... who has fifteen or more
employees." Whether an employer is exempt under this rule
depends strictly on the number of its employees. An exempt
employer might engage in any business in any industry. It might
generate less than a million dollars in revenues, or it might
generate hundreds of millions in revenues. It might employ
unskilled laborers or clerical workers, or it might employ highly
skilled computer software engineers, doctors or lawyers. No
matter what its business, revenues or types of employees, it is
exempt from Title VII and the other major federal anti-
discrimination laws as long as it never exceeds the threshold
number of employees.
Qualification for a small firm exemption might have been
based on other measures. The FLSA, for example, grants a
partial exemption to small "enterprises" based on revenue. 28
Counting dollars of revenue is no more arbitrary a test of size
than counting heads. A firm that wants to know whether it is
exempt in any particular year, however, can more easily know or
predict the size of its workforce than its revenue, and it can more
easily avoid crossing a threshold based on workforce size.
Moreover, Title VII was preceded by, and modeled after, two
decades of state civil rights laws and at least a century of other
employment regulations that often granted exemptions based on
28 See 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(ii) (2000) (including only those enterprises "Whose
annual gross volume of sales made or business done is not less than $500,000').
1204 [Vol. 80:1197
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head counts, 29 and this manner of measuring size is consistent
with the likely purposes of a small firm exemption in
discrimination law. Congressional debates leading to the
enactment of Title VII in 1964 and its amendment in 1972 reveal
at least five possible purposes for a small firm exemption: (1) to
relieve small firms of the otherwise disproportionate costs they
might bear under the new law;3 0 (2) to preserve a right of
"personal" relationships beyond government intervention; 31 (3) to
permit racial or ethnic self-help by small firms and family-owned
businesses; 32  (4) to avoid over-extension of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC') limited
resources; 33 and (5) to defuse at least some business opposition to
Title VII and preserve enough support for its enactment.34 Much
more will be said about these purposes and their relevance to the
single employer doctrine in Part IV of this article.
B. The Single Employer Doctrine
The small firm exemption requires a headcount of the
alleged employer's employees, but there might be a question
about who or what constitutes the "employer." An administrative
29 By 1964, most states outside the Old South had adopted civil rights laws, and
the fact that many of these laws included small employer exemptions was widely
noted in Congress, both as an example for federal legislation and as a basis for
determining whether federal law exempted too many or too few employers. See, e.g.,
110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); 110 Cong. Rec. 6562
(1964) (statement of Sen. Kuchel); 110 Cong. Rec. 7214 (1964) (memorandum of
Sens. Clark and Chase).
Even before the civil rights era, a head count of employees was the usual
measure of size for small firm exemptions in many state labor laws. See supra notes
5-6 and accompanying text.
30 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
31 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
32 See discussion infra Part IV.C.
33 See discussion infra Part IV.D.
34 See discussion infra Part IV.E. A sixth possible explanation, to assure Title
VII's constitutionality by reaching only businesses certain to have a significant
impact on commerce, appears to have been asserted by opponents of Title VII mainly
as a distraction. After all, the constitutional basis for Title VII was not the commerce
power, but the Fourteenth Amendment. See H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 108-10 (1963)
(separate minority views of Hon. Richard H. Poff and Hon. William Cramer) ('1I]f
the interstate commerce clause can be broadened and deepened to this extent, then
the concept of intrastate commerce is obsolete.'), reprinted in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 2108 (1968) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES
VII AND XI]; 110 Cong. Rec. 7208-12 (1964) (statement of Sen. Clark); 110 Cong.
Rec. 13079 (1964) (statement of Sen. Clark).
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agency or an individual plaintiff seeking to overcome a small firm
defense might argue in favor of combining the workforce of the
nominal employer with the workforces of affiliated corporations
to reach a total in excess of the threshold for coverage. This
argument depends on the viability and applicability of the single
employer doctrine, also known as the 'Integrated enterprise"
doctrine.35
The idea of treating multiple entities as a single employer is
not limited to issues in collective bargaining or discrimination
law. One finds variations of the doctrine across the board in
employment law, and beginning long before Title VII or the
Wagner Act. The proponent of the doctrine is usually an
employee or enforcement agency seeking to extend statutory
coverage or extend certain employer duties to multiple entities,
but an employer can also benefit from some variations of the
doctrine. In workers' compensation law, for example, a
corporation affiliated with an injured employee's nominal
employer might claim to be one and the same employer, in order
to assert the employer's "exclusive remedy" defense.3 6  In
collective bargaining law, two or more corporations might assert
the single employer doctrine to support their proposal for a
bargaining unit combining employees of both corporations, in
order to dilute a union's strength and make it more difficult for
the union to organize employees.
In brief, the prevailing version of the single employer
doctrine in discrimination and collective bargaining law regards
a group of persons-usually multiple corporations-as a single
35 See, e.g., EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EEOC
COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 2(III)(B)(1)(a)(iii)(a) (2000), available at http://www.eeoc.gov
/policy/docs/threshold.html#2-III-B- 1-a-iii-(a) [hereinafter EEOC COMPLIANCE
MANUAL] ('An integrated enterprise is one in which the operations of two or more
employers are considered so intertwined that they can be considered the single
employer of the charging party.').
36 See, e.g., Hall v. Fanticone, 730 A.2d 919, 920 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1999); Sweeney v. City of New York, 4 Misc. 3d 834, 836-38, 782 N.Y.S.2d 537, 542-
43 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 2004) (holding that whether vessel owner was plaintiffs
employer for purposes of limiting liability under maritime workers' compensation act
was question of fact); cf. Clark v. United Techs. Auto., Inc., 594 N.W.2d 447, 453
(Mich. 1999) (remanding case for determination of whether "economic realities"
supported treating owner and his corporation as a single employer of plaintiff, for
purposes of the exclusive remedy defense); Gunderson v. Harrington, 632 N.W.2d
695, 701-02 (Minn. 2001) (holding that owner who was "alter ego"of the corporation
he owned was entitled to assert exclusive remedy defense against employee of the
corporation).
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employer if the facts show (1) common ownership or financial
control, 37 (2) common management,38 (3) centralized control of
labor relations, and/or 39 (4) interrelation of operations. 40 The test
is far from mathematically precise. Some degree of common
ownership appears to be a premise of most descriptions of the
doctrine in the context of employment discrimination law, but the
EEOC advocates a more aggressive view, 41 and some variations
of the doctrine in collective bargaining and wage and hour law
can apply to separately owned firms. 42 For reasons I explain in
the course of this article, I take a more limited view that
separately owned and organized entities merely doing business
together cannot be a single employer for purposes of coverage
under discrimination law, even if their operations become closely
integrated or interrelated. In order for two private firms 43 to be a
37 E.g., Murray v. Miner, 74 F.3d 402, 404 (2d Cir. 1996); Evans v. McDonald's
Corp., 936 F.2d 1087, 1089 (10th Cir. 1991); Baker v. Stuart Broad. Co., 560 F.2d
389, 392 (8th Cir. 1977).
38 Murray, 74 F.3d at 404; Evans, 936 F.2d at 1089; Baker, 560 F.2d at 392.
39 Murray, 74 F.3d at 404; Evans, 936 F.2d at 1089; Baker, 560 F.2d at 392.
Whether the test should be stated in the disjunctive or conjunctive is one of many
issues about the test. In most forums, the requirements for application of the
doctrine can be satisfied with something less than proof of all four factors. See
generally EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 35 ("All of the factors should be
considered in assessing whether separate entities constitute an integrated
enterprise, but it is not necessary that all factors be present, nor is the presence of
any single factor dispositive.').
40 See Baker, 560 F.2d at 392 (listing several cases that 'hold that the standard
to be employed to determine whether consolidation of separate entities is proper are
the standards promulgated by the National Labor Relations Board: (1) interrelation
of operations, (2) common management, (3) centralized control of labor relations; and
(4) common ownership or financial control'); Evans, 936 F.2d at 1089.
41 See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 35 (taking the position that the
doctrine applies when "the operations of two or more employers are ... so
intertwined that they can be considered the single employer') (emphasis added). It
does not appear, however, that the EEOC or any other party has successfully
asserted the doctrine in a reported case without common controlling ownership. The
best case for application of the doctrine without common ownership might be where
nonprofit institutions are not "owned" but are subject to common government or
financial control. A few courts have entertained application of the doctrine in such
cases. See, e.g., Tatum v. Everhart, 954 F. Supp. 225, 229-30 (D. Kan. 1997) (finding
that separately-incorporated nonprofit organizations were not a single employer).
42 See infra text accompanying notes 154-155, 190-193.
43 Title VII's rules of coverage require the same headcount of employees for
public employers as for private firms. The prevailing view, however, is that the
single employer doctrine does not apply to public entities. See Sandoval v. City of
Boulder, 388 F.3d 1312, 1323 & n.3 (10th Cir. 2004) ("Absent some indication that
the state's decision was motivated by a desire to circumvent the civil rights laws or
other laws, principles of comity counsel federal courts not to be too quick to erase
2006] 1207
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
single employer, either one must own the other or they must
have a common owner or parent. Even assuming, however,
common ownership is an essential element, none of the various
judicial or administrative descriptions of the doctrine offers a
precise threshold or standard for common ownership. Common
controlling ownership is probably very important. The relative
importance of the other factors is also a matter of dispute. It is
widely agreed, however, that a strong showing for one of the
remaining factors-especially centralized labor relations-can
compensate for a weak showing for the others. 44  Many
authorities regard a finding of centralized labor relations as very
important in every case. 45
When separate corporations are a "single employer," they are
treated as one entity for one or more employment law purposes,
including satisfaction of statutory coverage thresholds. In this
regard the single employer doctrine is distinct from some other
doctrines, such as the 'Joint employer" doctrine, 46 that are
frequently confused with the single employer doctrine. The joint
employer doctrine recognizes that one employee can have two or
more separate employers, who need not be affiliated by common
control or ownership. Joint employers are not treated as a single
entity.47 For example, one or both might be exempt small firms
even if the combined total of their employees is in excess of the
statutory threshold.
The single employer doctrine is also sometimes confused
with other doctrines that have a potentially more radical effect,
organizational dividing lines drawn up by state authorities.') (citation omitted);
see also Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, 166 F.3d 1332, 1344 (11th Cir. 1999) ('The
strong comity and federalism concerns we have mentioned require that we accord
substantial deference to a state lawmaking body's determination of whether two or
more governmental entities are separate and distinct.').
44 See Walter V. Siebert & N. Dawn Webber, Joint Employer, Single Employer,
and Alter Ego, 3 LAB. LAW. 873, 875 (1987).
45 See, e.g., EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 35 ('The primary focus
should be on centralized control of labor relations.'); Sandoval, 388 F.3d at 1322
("For purposes of finding shared liability, we 'generally consider the third factor-
centralized control of labor relations-to be the most important.' "(quoting Bristol v.
Bd. of County Comm'rs, 312 F.3d 1213, 1220 (10th Cir. 2002))).
46 See Sandoval, 388 F.3d at 1324 ('While the single employer test looks at the
overall relationships of the two entities, joint employer status is determined by
focusing on the entities' relationships to a given employee or class of employees.').
47 See Arculeo v. On-Site Sales & Mktg., L.L.C., 425 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 2005)
(noting that joint employers are separate entities); see also Siebert & Webber, supra
note 44, at 881.
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effectively piercing the corporate veil and dissolving the legal
separation between two corporate entities or between a
corporation and its owner. The alter ego doctrine, for example,
includes consideration of many of the same factors as the single
employer doctrine, but it includes proof of the owners' intent to
evade the law by separate incorporations. 48 Even if the alter ego
doctrine is used for a limited purpose in a particular proceeding,
the implications of a finding of intent to evade the law or to
defraud employees and their representatives could have farther-
reaching implications. In contrast, the single employer doctrine
does not require or imply any wrongful intent on the part of the
entities that comprise the employer. A finding of single employer
status does not necessarily taint the separateness of the affiliated
corporations for any other purpose. The EEOC's official position
in this regard is more aggressive. According to the Commission,
the single employer doctrine can impose financial liability on all
the affiliated corporations based on the discriminatory act of any
one of them. 49 For reasons I explain in the course of this article I
take a more limited view, that proof of the requirements for
single employer status for purposes of coverage would not
necessarily justify piercing the corporate veil for purposes of
liability without additional circumstances. The doctrine serves
its most important role in discrimination law simply by denying
an exemption to firms that do not really fit within Congress'
likely idea of the exempt class. Whether the doctrine has other
proper functions in employment discrimination law is a separate
issue.
C. An Example of the Doctrine and Its Critics: Papa v. Katy
Industries, Inc.
Not very long after Congress enacted Title VII, federal courts
48 See Kilpatrick Bros., Inc. v. Poynter, 473 P.2d 33, 41-42 (Kan. 1970) ('IT]he
doctrine of alter ego fastens liability on the individual who uses a corporation merely
as an instrumentality to conduct his own personal business, such liability arising
from fraud or injustice perpetrated not on the corporation but on third persons
dealing with the corporation. Under it the court merely disregards corporate entity
and holds the individual responsible for his acts knowingly and intentionally done in
the name of the corporation.').
49 The EEOC also takes the view in its Compliance Manual that if two firms
constitute a "single employer," an administrative charge against one is a charge
against the other, and that "relief can be obtained from any of the entities that form
part of the integrated enterprise." See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 35.
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held in a number of cases that the single employer doctrine does
limit the small firm exemption. 50  Judicial support for the
doctrine appeared to build through the 1980s and early
nineties, 51 and the EEOC currently takes a particularly strong
position in favor of the doctrine. 52 Lately, however, some courts
have questioned whether the single employer doctrine is
appropriate for questions of coverage under the discrimination
laws. A recent example of judicial resistance to the doctrine is
Papa.53 In Papa, Judge Posner wrote for a panel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that rejected the single
employer doctrine for purposes of the small firm exemption under
Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA'), and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ('ADEA'). 54 The better
rule, Judge Posner and other critics say, is the one that serves for
most other purposes: A corporation stands alone as a person and
as an employer, provided its owners do not give cause to pierce
the corporate veil.55
Papa was not the first occasion for a federal court to question
whether the doctrine properly limits the small firm exemption.
An initial problem for the courts has been the perceived lack of
text in the discrimination statutes to support an exception to the
usual rule that each corporation is a separate person. In Lusk v.
Foxmeyer Health Corp.,56 for example, Judge Jolly of the Fifth
Circuit wrote that the ADEA's definition of "employer" (which is
modeled after the Title VII definition) 'plainly contains no basis"
for treating separately incorporated entities as one.57 The court's
dissatisfaction with the single employer doctrine might have
been aggravated by the particular application proposed by the
plaintiff, which was to pierce the corporate veil and extend
50 See infra notes 206-211 and accompanying text.
51 See, e.g., Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1337 & n.5 (6th Cir. 1983),
overruled by Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1242 (2006) (noting the
increasing adoption by district courts of the doctrine's four-part test).
52 See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 35.
53 Papa, 166 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1019 (1999)
(noting that the doctrine is not helpful in resolving certain issues because 'the test
was not custom-designed for answering exemption questions under the
antidiscrimination laws').
54 See id. at 939, 943.
55 See id. at 940-41.
56 129 F.3d 773 (5th Cir. 1997).
57 See id. at 777.
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liability, rather than to overcome the small firm exemption.58 In
any event, the court found itself bound by Fifth Circuit precedent
not to reject the doctrine out of hand.5 9
In lieu of a clear statutory mandate for the single employer
doctrine, one might look to a pair of Supreme Court decisions 60
arguably endorsing the doctrine as a matter of federal common
law. The scope of these decisions is open to question, however.
In each case the Court considered the single employer doctrine in
one of its early settings, collective bargaining. Critics urge that
the single employer doctrine's well-established role in collective
bargaining does not support the doctrine's extension into
employment discrimination law. In Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited,
Inc.,61 for example, Judge Ambro admitted a "surface appeal" to
the idea that collective bargaining laws and employment
discrimination laws serve the same purpose-regulating
"employer-employee relations"-and that a doctrine designed for
one law might also serve the other. 62 In Judge Ambro's view,
however, the single employer doctrine properly serves purposes
unique to collective bargaining law, such as establishing a
collective bargaining unit,63 or fulfilling Congress' mandate for
"expansive" National Labor Relations Board ('NLRB')
jurisdiction. 64  In contrast, Title VII is a law of limited
58 See id. at 775-76.
59 Id. at 777. The Fifth Circuit continues to acknowledge the single employer
doctrine. For purposes of affiliate liability in employment discrimination law,
however the Fifth Circuit applies a much eviscerated form of the doctrine, in which
the proponent ordinarily fails as a matter of law if he lacks proof that the separately
incorporated entity was actually involved in the decision of which the plaintiff
complains. See, e.g., Johnson v. Crown Enters, Inc., 398 F.3d 339, 343-44 (5th Cir.
2005) (holding that a parent company and its subsidiary are not a single enterprise
for purposes of a Title VII claim).
60 Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broad. Serv.
of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965) (per curiam) (listing the four factors to
determine whether several businesses may constitute a single employer); S. Prairie
Constr. Co. v. Local No. 627, International Union of Operating Engineers, 425 U.S.
800, 801-02, 806 (1976) (per curiam) (affirming the D.C. Circuit's use of the doctrine
in holding that two highway contractors are a single employer for purposes of an
NLRB collective bargaining agreement).
61 347 F.3d 72 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 959 (2004).
62 Id. at 85.
63 Id. at 84-85 (citing Marc Crandley, Note, The Failure of the Integrated
Enterprise Test: Why Courts Need To Find New Answers to the Multiple-Employer
Puzzle in Federal Discrimination Cases, 75 IND. L.J. 1041, 1064-65 (2000)).
64 Nesbit, 347 F.3d at 85 (citing Crandley, supra note 63, at 1065-66). According
to this view, the NLRB's jurisdiction is "expansive" because it has authority to
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jurisdiction, and one important jurisdictional limit is the small
firm exemption. Judge Ambro believed that allowing
complainants to overcome the small firm exemption by invoking
the single employer doctrine would be inconsistent with the
exemption's purpose: "to spare small companies the considerable
expense of complying with the statute's many-nuanced
requirements.'6 5
Uncertainty about the viability of the single employer
doctrine was an opportunity for Judge Posner to offer his own
analysis of the problem in Papa. In Papa, Judge Posner argued
that the courts should completely reject the single employer
doctrine, or at least to confine it to collective bargaining law.66
Papa was a consolidation of two cases in which employer
defendants asserted that they were too small to be considered
"employers" under federal employment discrimination laws.67 In
the first case, James Papa sued two affiliated corporations-a
parent company and the subsidiary that employed him-for
alleged age and disability discrimination. 6 Papa lost his job with
the subsidiary after the parent became unhappy with the
subsidiary's poor financial performance and ordered the
subsidiary to close certain manufacturing operations.69 Closing
these operations required layoffs, including the elimination of
Papa's job, but it was the subsidiary and not the parent that
selected Papa in particular for layoff.70 When Papa charged age
and disability discrimination, the subsidiary asserted the small
address any case in which a labor dispute might have an impact on commerce. See
infra text accompanying notes 123-144, 150-154.
65 Nesbit, 347 F.3d at 85.
66 Id. at 940-43.
67 Id. at 939.
68 Id. Mr. Walsh's age discrimination claim was based on the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000). His disability
discrimination claim was based on the Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2000). Each of these acts defines "employer" as a 'Person"
who employs a minimum number of employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (at least
twenty employees); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (at least fifteen employees).
69 Papa, 166 F.3d at 939; Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 11-12, Papa, 166
F.3d 937 (No. 98-2009).
70 Papa, 166 F.3d at 939; Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 69, at 9-
11. In the lower court proceedings Papa evidently argued that the parent directed
the selection of employees for layoff, but the district court found otherwise, and its
finding was not contested on appeal. See Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., No. 95-C-5290,
1998 WNL 142390, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 1998).
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firm defense. 71 Evidently, the subsidiary had employed too few
employees to meet the twenty employee threshold of the ADEA
or even the fifteen employee threshold of the ADA. But the
parent corporation, which controlled the subsidiary through an
intermediate corporate shell, owned many other subsidiaries
collectively employing more than a thousand employees. 72
The companion case, EEOC v. GJHSRT, Inc., presented
similar features. The EEOC sought relief for Richard Mueser for
alleged retaliation in violation of Title VII. 73 Mueser's nominal
employer, GJHSRT, employed too few employees to qualify as a
covered employer, but the EEOC also named Frederick Transport
Group, Inc., a holding company that owned GJHSRT and other
subsidiaries. The EEOC alleged that the entire family of
corporations constituted a single employer with more than
enough employees to overcome the small employer defense. 74
Both cases offered a plausible basis for the single employer
doctrine. Each nominal employer was a member of a family of
corporations wholly owned by a parent or holding company, thus
satisfying the "common ownership" factor as to any of the
affiliated corporations. In each case, there was at least some
evidence of the second factor: common management. In Papa,
the parent and subsidiary were governed by the same officers
and directors, and the subsidiary's managers reported directly to
the president of the parent company.75 In GJHSRT, the parent
and subsidiary shared the same president, and two individuals
who were primary shareholders served on both boards of
directors. 76 As for the third factor, centralized labor management
relations, the evidence showed that the respective parent
companies pooled the workforces of their subsidiaries, including
the employer subsidiaries, into common employee benefit plans,
and to some degree they provided centralized administration of
payroll. 77
71 Papa, 166 F.3d at 939.
72 Id.; Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 69, at 12.
73 Papa, 166 F.3d at 939.
74 Id.; see also Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 1-2, Papa, 166 F.3d 937 (No. 98-
2185).
75 Papa, 166 F.3d at 939; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 7-8, Papa, 166 F.3d 937
(No. 98-2009).
76 Papa, 166 F.3d at 939; Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 74, at 17-
18.
77 Papa, 166 F.3d at 939; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 75, at 10-13;
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The fourth factor, interrelation of operations, was the weak
link for both cases. Although the parent corporations provided
their subsidiaries with some general administrative services,
such as payroll, neither employer subsidiary was integrated into
a common enterprise with its parent or other affiliated
corporations.78 Indeed, the facts in Papa do not disclose any
connection between the employer's manufacture of printing
presses and the business of any of the affiliated companies.7 9 In
GJHSRT the argument for interrelationship of operations was
somewhat stronger because all members of the corporate family
engaged in the same type of business: trucking. Judge Posner's
opinion states, however, that each of the affiliated corporations
was "engaged in a different phase of the trucking business and at
a different location.'" 0 Evidently, the EEOC failed to present
evidence that the different trucking businesses shared customers
or facilities, or were integral parts of a common venture."'
The lower courts in each case granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendants based on the small firm defense, finding
that the facts did not support treating either family of
corporations as a single employer.8 2 Judge Posner's opinion
affirmed for a completely different reason. Judge Posner wholly
rejected the single employer doctrine, at least for purposes of the
small firm defense in employment discrimination law.8 3
Like Judge Jolly in Lusk, Judge Posner evidently found
nothing in the language of Title VII or the other discrimination
laws that would support the single employer doctrine. The Title
VII version of the doctrine, Judge Posner surmised, originated in
court decisions that had "copied verbatim" from collective
bargaining law,84 evidently without sufficient forethought.85 In
Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 74, at 21-23.
78 See Papa, 166 F.3d at 939, 942.
79 In another case, United States v. Schurrer, 156 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 1998),
the court described the same parent company (Katy Industries) as a "mini
conglomerate" that bought and sold a variety of consumer, industrial and machinery
manufacturing businesses. Id. at 1245.
80 Papa, 166 F.3d at 939; see also Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 74,
at 4, 8, 14.
8' Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 74, at 4, 8, 10, 14-15, 25-26.
82 Papa, 166 F.3d at 939; Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., No. 95-C-5290, 1998 WL
142390 at *2, *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 1998).
83 Papa, 166 F.3d at 942-43.
84 Id. at 940.
85 Id. at 942-43 (stating that courts that rely on the doctrine are 'insufficiently
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contrast with the some other jurisdictions, however, the Seventh
Circuit lacked decisive precedent for adopting the doctrine in an
employment discrimination case.86  Nor was Judge Posner
persuaded by the Supreme Court precedents applying the
doctrine in the collective bargaining setting. Like Judge Ambro
in Nesbit, Judge Posner conceded that 'there is an argument"
that collective bargaining law requires a single employer
doctrine,8 7 but he was unenthusiastic towards the doctrine for
any purpose. The doctrine's four factors, he argued, were vague,
unweighted, and frequently pointed in opposite directions. 88 The
Supreme Court had sanctioned the doctrine only for collective
bargaining law,8 9 and the doctrine was properly confined to that
purpose. Transplanted to employment discrimination law, the
single employer doctrine would frustrate the goal of the small
firm exemption, which was "to spare very small firms from the
potentially crushing expense of mastering the intricacies of the
antidiscrimination laws, establishing procedures to assure
compliance, and defending against suits when efforts at
sensitive to the bearing of context on the proper formulation of rules of affiliate
liability').
86 Judge Posner discounted dicta in earlier decisions of the Seventh Circuit that
appeared to endorse the doctrine. Id. at 939-40. None of the earlier Seventh Circuit
decisions involved a successful assertion of the single employer doctrine in an
employment discrimination case. In two Seventh Circuit cases, Sharpe v. Jefferson
Distrib. Co., 148 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 1998), and Rogers v. Sugar Tree Prods, Inc., 7
F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 1993), the court found the facts insufficient to require reversal of
district court findings that separately incorporated entities did not constitute single
employers. Sharpe, 148 F.3d at 678-79; Rogers, 7 F.3d at 581-82. In a third Seventh
Circuit case, EEOC v. Illinois, 69 F.3d 167 (7th Cir. 1995), the court reversed a
district court judgment that treated the State of Illinois as the real employer of
teachers employed by local public school districts. Id. at 170-72. In an opinion
written by Judge Posner, the court rejected the EEOC's argument that the
relationship between the State and the school districts was analogous to that of a
single employer/integrated enterprise. Judge Posner wrote that, 'The principle that
animates the [single employer] doctrine is not limited to the technical relation of
parent to subsidiary corporation," but he found the facts insufficient to support a
single employer claim. Id. at 171.
87 Papa, 166 F.3d. at 940, 942. Judge Posner cited two situations involving a
possibly appropriate application of the single employer doctrine: where the combined
operations of integrated firms might satisfy the NLRB's discretionary jurisdictional
standards, and where an appropriate bargaining unit of employees might include
employees of separately incorporated firms in an integrated enterprise. Id. at 942.
88 Id. at 940.
89 Id. at 942-43; see S. Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local No. 627, International Union
of Operating Engineers, 425 U.S. 800, 801-04, 806 (1976) (per curiam); Radio &
Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broad. Serv. of Mobile, Inc.,
380 U.S. 255, 256-57 (1965) (per curiam).
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compliance fail. '9 Judge Posner explained at some length why it
might be good policy to exempt small firms from these burdens
and why the single employer doctrine is inconsistent with this
policy. 91 Judge Posner's policy and economic arguments are
examined in greater detail in Part IV of this article.
Although Judge Posner rejected the notion that the single
employer doctrine should be used to extend employer coverage,
he offered three situations in which a corporate employer's
affiliation with another corporation might justify aggregating the
two entities' combined workforces. The first was where the facts
would support piercing the corporate veil to make one
corporation liable for the debts of the other, according to
traditional principles. 92 The second was where an enterprise had
"split itself up into a number of corporations, each with fewer
than the statutory minimum number of employees, for the
express purpose of avoiding liability under the discrimination
laws.'1 3 The third was where the parent or other affiliated
corporation actually took the action about which the plaintiff
complained, such as by ordering the employer subsidiary to adopt
an unlawful policy or to discharge a particular employee for
unlawful reasons. 94 In other words, Judge Posner would not
treat separate entities as a single employer for purposes of
coverage, unless a court would be justified in extending liability
to both entities under traditional principles (excluding the single
employer doctrine). Neither of the cases before the court in Papa
included facts sufficient to justify disregard of separate
incorporation based on the three scenarios envisioned by Judge
Posner. 95 Thus, the Seventh Circuit upheld the lower courts'
dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims based on the small firm
exemption defense. 96
The position of Judge Posner and others who reject the
single employer doctrine in employment discrimination law can
be summarized as follows. First, the NLRB invented the single
employer doctrine to serve special purposes in the law of
collective bargaining, and the doctrine's function in collective
90 Papa, 166 F.3d at 940.
91 Id. at 940-42.
92 Id. at 940-41.
93 Id. at 941 (emphasis added).
94 Id.
95 Id. at 942.
96 Id. at 943.
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bargaining is distinctively different from its proposed function in
employment discrimination law. Second, neither Title VII nor
the other federal discrimination statutes provide any textual
foundation for the doctrine. Finally, the legislative history and
likely purpose of the small firm exemption weigh against the
single employer doctrine. The following sections of this article
will take a closer look at each of these arguments.
II. THE HISTORICAL PRECEDENT FOR THE SINGLE EMPLOYER
DOCTRINE
Critics of the single employer doctrine typically assume that
the doctrine evolved for purposes unique to the Wagner Act and
different from the purposes for which plaintiffs and the EEOC
seek to enlist the doctrine in employment discrimination cases.
The history of the doctrine is actually much more complex and in
many respects contrary to the critics' assumptions. An accurate
account is important for several reasons. First, the doctrine's
history may be relevant to the effect and scope of the Supreme
Court's decisions upholding the doctrine in specific contexts. Of
course, the mere fact that the Wagner Act and Title VII are two
distinctly different laws might be reason enough to deny that the
Court's decisions under the Wagner Act compel any particular
interpretation of Title VII. The greater significance of history is
its usefulness in understanding Congress' likely knowledge,
experience, and intent in adopting the small firm exemption.
History makes a persuasive case for concluding that Congress
anticipated the single employer doctrine as a limit on the small
firm exemption.
A. Pre- Wagner Act Origins of the Single Employer Doctrine
Describing the single employer doctrine as a peculiar
outgrowth of the Wagner Act is to suggest that the doctrine is an
unnatural and unwelcome interloper in employment
discrimination law or anywhere else beyond its original domain.
But this description of the doctrine's origin overlooks the
doctrine's use for a variety of purposes in employment relations
before the Wagner Act. In 1935, when Congress enacted the
Wagner Act, the idea of treating multiple corporations as if they
were a single employer for purposes of employment law was
neither novel nor particularly controversial. The idea was partly
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rooted in an even earlier set of laws regulating the employee
relations of railroads.
The railroad industry was an early testing ground for federal
regulation of labor relations because its effect on interstate
commerce was indisputable at a time when the Commerce power
was still quite limited. 97 As a result, early federal labor law was
shaped in part by the law of common carriers. One important
aspect of the law of common carriers was that a passenger
injured by one incorporated railroad could sue another
corporation that dominated the "system" of interlocking railroad
corporations of which the first corporation was a part.98 It was
no great stretch for the courts to apply the same approach for the
benefit of injured railroad workers in common law personal
injury actions. 99 When Congress enacted the Federal Employers
Liability Act in 1908,100 the courts continued the practice of
treating related railroad corporations as a single carrier. 101
97 See Va. Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 553-56 (1937); see also
James W. Ely, Jr., "The Railroad System Has Burst Through State Limits":
Railroads and Interstate Commerce, 1830-1920, 55 ARK. L. REV. 933, 965-70 (2003)
(detailing the development of interstate commerce legislation during the nascent
stages of the railroad industry).
98 See Davis v. Alexander, 269 U.S. 114, 117 (1925) ("Where one railroad
company actually controls another and operates both as a single system, the
dominant company will be liable for injuries due to the negligence of the subsidiary
company.'); Lehigh Valley R.R. Co. v. Dupont, 128 F. 840, 845-46 (2d Cir. 1904);
Ross v. Pa. R.R. Co., 148 A. 741, 742-43 (N.J. 1930); see also Bethlehem Steel Co. v.
Raymond Concrete Pile Co., 118 A. 279, 284-85 (Md. 1922), superseded by statute,
MD. ANN. CODE art. 101 § 58 (West 1957), as recognized in Hubbard v. Livingstron
Fire Prot., 426 A.2d 901 (Md. 1981) (discussing tort liability of common carriers).
99 See, e.g., Lehigh Valley R.R. Co. v. Delachesa, 145 F. 617, 617-19 (2d Cir.
1906) (extending negligence liability for injury caused to railroad worker by a
subordinate company); St. Louis & S.F. R.R. Co. v. Arms, 136 S.W. 1164, 1166-68
(Tex. Civ. App. 1911) (extending liability for the negligence of a subsidiary railroad
company).
100 Act of April 22, 1908, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (codified as amended at 45
U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2000)).
101 See, e.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Krysienski, 238 F. 142, 144-45 (2d Cir. 1916)
(stating that a company's controlling interest in another is material in determining
which company is liable for worker injury); Eddings v. Collins Pine Co., 140 F. Supp.
622, 625-29 (N.D. Cal. 1956); Conry v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 112 F. Supp. 252, 255
(W.D. Pa. 1953); Wichita Falls & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Puckett, 157 P. 112, 121-27 (Okla.
1915); E. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 153 S.W. 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912). Treating
separately incorporated railroads as if they were one was an exception to the rule,
already well established at the beginning of the twentieth century, that separately
incorporated businesses, including railroads, are separate legal entities. See
Peterson v. Chic., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 364, 388-94 (1907).
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Railroads also provided the first setting for a federal law of
collective bargaining. During the early twentieth century, when
federal law depended mainly on voluntary compliance with
government mediation, 10 2 unions representing railway workers
sometimes organized according to systems of affiliated railways,
such as the 'Pennsylvania System," which combined a number of
separately incorporated railroads.10 3  In the early stages of
collective bargaining law it was purely a matter of private
arrangement between the parties whether a union treated a
group of railroad corporations as a single employer and whether
the affiliated corporations behaved as a single employer.1 0 4 The
practice began its evolution into a rule of law in 1926, when
Congress enacted the Railway Labor Act ('RLA')'0 5 and granted
real enforcement authority to the Railway Labor Board ('RLB').
Over the next decade, the RLB developed a line of precedent for
treating affiliated railroads as a "single carrier" for purposes of
collective bargaining. Under the single carrier rule, employees of
multiple affiliated corporations could be combined into a single
unit to bargain collectively with the carrier system:
If the operations of a subsidiary are jointly managed with
operations of other carriers and the employees have also been
merged and are subject to the direction of a single management,
102 The earliest substantial federal regulation of labor relations in the railway
industry occurred during World War I, when the federal government seized the
railroads and controlled relations with the unions. See Act of August 29, 1916, ch.
418, 39 Stat. 619, 645; see also Pa. Sys. Bd. of Adjustment of Bhd. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 1
F.2d 171, 172 (3d Cir. 1924) (describing the wartime seizure).
At the end of the War, Congress enacted the Transportation Act of February 28,
1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 469-74 (1920), to resolve labor disputes by arbitration. In
Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. United States Railroad Labor Board, 261 U.S. 72
(1923), however, the Supreme Court held that the Railroad Labor Board's decisions
were unenforceable except by force of public opinion. Id. at 79.
103 See Pa. R.R. Sys. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 267 U.S. 203, 205 (1925). The Pennsylvania
Railroad system's family tree is outlined in Robert T. Netzlof, Corporate Genealogy:
The Pennsylvania Railroad, July 15, 2002, http://broadway.pennsyrr.com/rail
/prr/Corphist/prrl.html. Also see Switchmen's Union v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 135
F.2d 785, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1943), rev'd, 320 U.S. 297 (1943), which describes the New
York Central Railroad system and the unions that represented employees of the
carriers in that system.
104 The Railway Labor Board had no enforceable authority under the
Transportation Act. Its function was mainly to provide a public forum where the
force of public opinion might weigh on the parties and force them to end their
dispute. See U.S. R.R. Labor Bd., 261 U.S. at 79-80.
105 Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926).
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then the larger unit of management is taken to be the carrier
rather than the individual subsidiary companies.10 6
In 1934 Congress codified the doctrine by amending the
RLA's definition of "carrier" to include all railroads, "and any
company which is directly or indirectly owned or controlled by or
under common control with any carrier by railroad and which
operates any equipment or facilities or performs any service" for
transportation by railroad. 10 7 With this endorsement, the single
carrier rule became the basis not only for system-wide bargaining
units but also for extending the RLB's authority to firms that,
standing alone, were not "carriers" but were affiliated with
carriers. 108
At about the same time, state courts were developing still
another use for a single employer doctrine as part of the common
law of secondary boycotts in collective bargaining. In a
secondary boycott, a union attempts to bring additional pressure
to bear against a particular employer (the "primary" employer)
by threatening to induce a strike or other action against another
employer (the "secondary" or "neutral" employer) to force the
neutral employer to cease doing business with the primary
employer. 10 9 Until the Taft-Hartley Act,110 the states prohibited
or restricted secondary boycotts mainly as a matter of tortious
interference with the neutral's business, but a union might assert
the defense that the putative neutral was not really separate
from the primary employer or was not neutral in the dispute. In
some cases state courts held that separately incorporated
employers could be treated as one, exposing the putative neutral
employer to the same picketing as the primary employer."'
106 Switchmen's Union, 135 F.2d at 791 (quoting 1935 NAT'L MEDIATION BD.
ANN. REP. 22) (upholding the single carrier doctrine).
107 Act of June 21, 1934, ch. 691 § 1, 48 Stat. 1185 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 151
(2000)).
108 See Thibodeaux v. Executive Jet Int'l, 328 F.3d 742, 752 (5th Cir. 2003)
(applying the RLA "substance-over-form analysis" to a company that operated
aircraft in fractional ownership programs).
109 See Richard A. Bock, Secondary Boycotts: Understanding NLRB
Interpretation of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, 7 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 905, 907-08 (2005) (defining the secondary boycott).
110 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (2000)).
111 See, e.g., Consol. Realty Co. v. Dyers, Finishers and Bleachers Federation, 45
A.2d 132, 133 (N.J. Ch. 1946); Newark Ladder & Bracket Sales Co. v. Furniture
Workers Union Local 66, 4 A.2d 49, 50-51 (N.J. Ch. 1939); Hydrox Ice Cream Co. v.
Doe, 159 Misc. 642, 643, 289 N.Y.S. 683, 684 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. 1936). But see
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B. The Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts
The single employer doctrine's headwaters may lie in the
early railway labor and tort laws, but the doctrine's robust
evolution and current notoriety are due mainly to the Wagner
Act. The Wagner Act extended federal collective bargaining law
to any labor dispute "affecting commerce," without limitation to
any particular industry.112 The Act was also the charter for a
new generation of labor lawyers, and the single employer
doctrine became part of their language.
The single employer doctrine continued its evolution as a
multi-purpose tool in the hands of the NLRB. Critics who oppose
extension of the doctrine beyond collective bargaining assert that
the Board's uses for the doctrine were unique to collective
bargaining. To be sure, most of the NLRB's applications for the
doctrine have no clear corollary in employment discrimination
law. One of the Board's earliest uses for the doctrine, however,
was to reach firms that might be exempt from the Board's
jurisdiction unless they were combined with affiliated firms into
a single employer. Critics find this use of the doctrine
distinguishable from the usual small firm/single employer
dispute under Title VII. According to the critics, the Board
developed the single employer doctrine as one of a set of rules
under which the Board relinquished some of its otherwise
"expansive" jurisdiction.11 3 Indeed, the Board has frequently
used the single employer doctrine to retrieve authority over small
firms that would otherwise fall outside the Board's self-imposed
jurisdictional standards. A full account of the Board's practices,
however, reveals that the Board's first use of the doctrine was to
secure the widest jurisdiction possible. In any event, a multi-
purpose single employer doctrine was so well known and
established in collective bargaining and other aspects of
employment law by 1964 that the drafters of Title VII certainly
State v. Casselman, 205 P.2d 1131, 1138-40 (Idaho 1949) (refusing to disregard
separate incorporation for purposes of secondary boycott law).
112 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (2000); id. § 160(a).
113 See supra text accompanying notes 61-65 (comments of Judge Ambro); supra
text accompanying notes 83-96 (comments of Judge Posner); see also Tatum v.
Everhart, 954 F. Supp. 225, 228 (D. Kan. 1997) (describing the Board's adoption of
the single employer test as a self-imposed mode of jurisdictional limitation);
Crandley, supra note 63, at 1052-54 (observing that the Board limited use of the
doctrine in light of the Board's broad jurisdiction).
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must have anticipated its potential effect on the small firm
exemption.
The text of the Wagner Act did not demand a single
employer doctrine. In contrast with the RLA, the Wagner Act's
declaration of a single employer doctrine was subtle at best, and
arguably fictive. The only language in the Act that could be
viewed as an indirect confirmation of the single employer
doctrine was the Act's unusual definition of "person," which
included "one or more individuals, labor organizations,
partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives,
trustees, trustees in cases under [T]itle 11, or receivers. "114
This definition, which suggests that "one or
more ... corporations" could be a single "person" for purposes of
federal collective bargaining law, was apparently unprecedented
as a statutory definition of "person" and rarely followed in other
statutes115-until thirty years later when Congress borrowed the
same definition for Title VII.116
Although the Act's definition of "person" might have
provided the statutory basis for a single employer doctrine, it did
not clearly provide any reason for such a doctrine. The Act
lacked a small firm exemption. At the time, a small firm
exemption would have seemed superfluous, because there were
serious doubts whether a federal law regulating more than
interstate transportation or communications could survive
constitutional review. The limits of Congress' power being
114 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (emphasis added).
115 One other statute of the New Deal-era that contained this definition of
'person" was the Walsh-Healey Act, ch. 881, § 7, 49 Stat. 2036, 2039 (1936) (codified
at 41 U.S.C. § 41 (2000)). The Walsh-Healey Act required federal contracts for the
manufacture or furnishing of "materials, supplies, articles, and equipment" to abide
by certain minimum terms and conditions of employment. Coverage under the Act
extended to contractors regardless of annual revenue or workforce size, although
coverage did depend on the amount of the particular contract. Consequently there
was little occasion to apply a single employer doctrine to extend coverage to small
firms. 49 Stat. at 2036 (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-40). But see United
States v. Davison Fuel & Dock Co., 371 F.2d 705, 713 (4th Cir. 1967) (holding that
separately incorporated enterprises, subject to common ownership, constituted the
manufacturer of goods subject to the Act's minimum employment standards, and
that the owner of these enterprises was responsible for the affiliated companies'
compliance).
116 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (2000). Title VII states: 'The
term 'person' includes one or more individuals, governments, governmental agencies,
political subdivisions, labor unions, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal
representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated
organizations, trustees, trustees in cases under title 11, or receivers."Id.
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uncertain and likely to be narrow, Congress drafted the Wagner
Act to reach as far as the Supreme Court might ultimately
permit. It authorized the NLRB to resolve employee
representation disputes "affecting commerce,"1 17 and to prevent
unfair labor practices "affecting commerce."'18  If the newly
authorized Board reached too far, the Court could rein the Board
back to the limits of Congress' constitutional power to regulate
commerce, and the essence of the Act would survive for labor
disputes indisputably "affecting commerce."1' 9  If the Court
moved toward a more permissive view, the Board's realm would
automatically expand with the Court's view.
At the outset, small firms had little to fear from the Wagner
Act unless they were directly involved in classic interstate
activity, like transporting goods across state lines. Considering
the Court's decisions before 1935, even some very large
employers might have expected to fall outside the National Labor
Relations Act's ("NLRA') coverage. They could have taken
comfort in cases such as Hammer v. Dagenhart,120 where the
Court invalidated Congress' first attempt at a child labor law. In
that case, the Court held that federal authorities lacked the
power to seize goods manufactured by young children even if the
goods were destined to cross state lines or did in fact cross state
lines. 121
It was against this backdrop that the NLRB decided its first
case, an unfair labor practice proceeding against the Greyhound
Bus Lines family of corporations.' 22  The Greyhound group
operated a number of separately incorporated bus lines and
supporting businesses such as repair and maintenance
117 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (2000).
118 Id. § 160(a).
119 One of the industries most obviously "affecting commerce," the railroads, was
already subject to the RLA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (2000), and Congress denied the
NLRB any authority over that industry. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2). Thus, in the worst
case scenario, the Court's very restrictive view of interstate commerce could have
left Board with only a small portion of the U.S. economy in its jurisdiction.
120 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941).
121 Id. at 271-72. The Court states: 'The making of goods and the mining of coal
are not commerce, nor does the fact that these things are to be afterwards shipped or
used in interstate commerce, make their production a part thereof." Id. at 272 (citing
Del., Lackawanna & W. R.R. Co. v. Yurkonis, 238 U.S. 439 (1915)).
122 Pa. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 1 (1935).
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garages. 123 One might have thought a bus system transporting
passengers across state lines was clearly engaged in interstate
commerce, and that its labor disputes were undoubtedly matters
"affecting commerce." The Board, however, left nothing to
chance, particularly the chance that the Court might view
separately incorporated garages and maintenance facilities as
purely intrastate enterprises. 124 In asserting its jurisdiction, the
Board emphasized that: the respondent corporations operated
"an integrated system"' 25 of interstate transportation; a holding
company owned stock interests in all of these corporations and
had a controlling interest in most of them; and common control
and integration were strengthened by "a system of interlocking
officers and directors."' 26 In sum, the Board stated most of the
elements of what observers later described as the "single
employer" or 'integrated enterprise" rule.' 27 The Board did not
specifically refer to precedents under the RLA, but it may be
more than a coincidence that the NLRB's first use of the single
employer doctrine involved an integrated transportation system.
The Board found that the respondent companies and the
entities with which they were affiliated had committed a number
of unfair labor practices, including unlawfully discharging
employees. 128 The named respondents included some, but not all
of the companies in the 'integrated" Greyhound system, and the
named corporations petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit for review of the Board's decision. 129 They asserted to the
court that they were not the employers of the employees in
question, and that the real employers were separately
incorporated subsidiaries not named as respondents. 30 The
123 Id. at 3-6, 46.
124 Many of the events that were the subject of the proceeding occurred at the
system's Pittsburgh garage. Id. at 5-6.
125 Id. at 3.
126 Id. at 4.
127 See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 4 N.L.R.B. 71, 76-78 (1937)
(summarizing evidence that the respondent companies formed a "unitary and
integrated system" with a clear impact on interstate commerce); Bloedel-Donovan
Lumber Mills, 8 N.L.R.B. 230, 232-35 (1938) (finding that a lumber company and its
subsidiary lumber retailer engaged in integrated operations with "substantial
relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States').
12s Pa. Greyhound Lines, 1 N.L.R.B. at 47, 50.
129 NLRB v. Pa. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 91 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1937).
130 Id. at 180 (Biggs, J., concurring, dissenting in part).
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court rejected this argument with scarcely a word. 131 The Board,
with the Third Circuit's blessing, had run roughshod over
Greyhound's separately incorporated units and treated them as
one employer, evidently to assure that local subsidiaries would
not escape the Board's interstate commerce-based jurisdiction,
and perhaps to avoid the necessity of naming each entity as a
respondent for every unfair labor practice charge.
Within a few months of the Board's Greyhound Lines
decision, the Supreme Court seemed to confirm the Board's worst
fears about jurisdiction. In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 132 the
Court reaffirmed its view that "commerce" equated with
"transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities
between the citizens of the different states."' 33 On this ground,
the Court quashed a law regulating collective bargaining in the
coal industry, because mining and production of goods were not
interstate commerce. 134  For a moment, the Board seemed
destined to rule over comparatively few employers of any size. 135
The following year, however, the Court issued its decision in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,136 adopting the broad
view of the commerce power. The Board's statutory jurisdiction,
drawn to reach as far as the commerce power might permit,
suddenly stretched to include nearly any but the very tiniest of
employers. 137 Jones & Laughlin Steel was quickly followed by
NLRB v. Fainblatt,1 38 rejecting an employer's argument that it
131 The main opinion of the court did not mention the argument, and the
concurring opinion of Justice Biggs tersely rejected it, stating only that 't]here was
ample evidence before the Board to sustain its finding that the discharged employees
were in fact mainly employed by the respondent .. . for the benefit of subsidiary
corporations engaged in actual transportation operations in interstate commerce."
Id.
132 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
133 Id. at 298.
134 Id. at 297, 304, 310 (quashing the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 801-827 (Supp. I 1935) (repealed 1937)).
135 From 1935 to 1937, federal district courts issued nearly 100 injunctions
against the NLRB based on Carter and on the Supreme Court's earlier decision in
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550-51 (1935),
invalidating the National Recovery Act. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Lead Co. v. Madden,
15 F. Supp. 407, 408-09 (N.D. Okla. 1936); El Paso Elec. Co. v. Elliott, 15 F. Supp.
81, 89-91 (W.D. Tex. 1936).
136 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
137 The Court implicitly overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918),
in Jones & Laughlin Steel. The official notice of death arrived four years later in
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941).
13s 306 U.S. 601 (1939).
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was beyond the Board's reach by virtue of the relatively small
part of its business connected to an intestate passage of goods.
Congress' power extended to all commerce 'be it great or
small."' 39  For purposes of statutory coverage, the amount of
interstate commerce was important "only to the extent that
Congress... excluded commerce of small volume from the
operation of its regulatory measure."' 40  But Congress had
imposed no such limits on the NLRB's jurisdiction.
The upshot of Jones & Laughlin Steel and Fainblatt was that
the Board's statutory jurisdiction and responsibility extended not
only to very large employers and workforces but also to a great
many small ones. The single employer doctrine was no longer
necessary to enlarge the Board's jurisdiction. But the doctrine
still had important roles to play in early NLRB practice. Above
all, the NLRB used the single employer/integrated enterprise
doctrine in the same manner as the RLB: to establish bargaining
units combining workforces of multiple 'Integrated"
corporations. 141 This particular use of the doctrine was not
necessarily to the disadvantage of employers. An employer
might prefer a larger bargaining unit to dilute the union's
support among employees. Sometimes, it was the affiliated
corporations who sought the larger bargaining unit. 142
The single employer doctrine also served other convenient
purposes for the NLRB. While the effect on commerce was much
easier to prove after Jones & Laughlin Steel and Fainblatt, it was
still the General Counsel's burden to prove it. The single
employer doctrine saved the General Counsel the burden of
proving the effect on commerce of each separately incorporated
part of an integrated enterprise. 143 The Board even used the
single employer doctrine to impose its remedies on the entirety of
the enterprise in a manner that effectively pierced the corporate
veil, making each separately incorporated entity liable for the
139 Id. at 606.
140 Id.
141 See Alexander Film Co., 36 N.L.R.B. 57, 59-62 (1941); Dixie Motor Coach
Corp., 25 N.L.R.B. 869, 876-78 (1940); Shenango Penn Mold Co., 19 N.L.R.B. 328,
331-32 (1940); Calco Chem. Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 34, 40-41 (1939); Royal Warehouse
Corp., 8 N.L.R.B. 1218, 1221 (1938); Bloedel-Donovan Lumber Mills, 8 N.L.R.B. 230,
235-38 (1938); Waggoner Ref. Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 731, 759-60 (1938); C. A. Lund Co., 6
N.L.R.B. 423, 434-35 (1938); Pa. Greyhound Lines, 3 N.L.R.B. 622, 631-35 (1937).
142 E.g., Waterman S.S. Corp., 10 N.L.R.B. 1079, 1082 (1939).
143 See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 85 N.L.R.B. 1519, 1520 (1949).
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misdeeds of any other member of the same enterprise. 144 As
noted earlier, the Act provided no definitively clear basis for a
single employer doctrine for any of these purposes. In some of its
earliest precedent-setting cases, however, the Board cited,
without much explanation, the Wagner Act's definition of
,person" as including "corporations.'145
Not long after Feinblatt, the NLRB began to develop the
rules of discretionary jurisdiction with which the single employer
doctrine is frequently associated today. In 1940 the Board hinted
at what was to come in Forest City Manufacturing Co.:146 'IT]he
Board has jurisdiction which it may exercise at its discretion,"
but 'It]he Board considers this case a proper one for the exercise
of its jurisdiction.' 47 The NLRB's reservation of discretion was
in anticipation that its now near-plenary jurisdiction might
overwhelm its administrative resources. 148 Initially the Board
declined jurisdiction case-by-case. The single employer doctrine
was simply one set of facts to show that the impact on commerce
was more than "de minimis" and to distinguish the NLRB's
exercise of discretionary jurisdiction in one case from its rejection
in another. 149  Congress validated the practice in the Taft-
144 See, e.g., R. M. Johnson, 41 N.L.R.B. 263, 282-83 (1942); Middle W. Corp., 28
N.L.R.B. 540, 546-47 (1940); Dixie Motor Coach Corp., 25 N.L.R.B. at 875-76, 925-
26; Condenser Corp. of Am., 22 N.L.R.B. 347, 449 (1940); Roemer Bros. Trucking
Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 549, 552-54 (1939); Waggoner Ref. Co., 6 N.L.R.B. at 737-39, 762.
145 A. E. Nettleton Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1670, 1676 n.3 (1954); Nat. Shoes, Inc., 103
N.L.R.B. 438, 440 n.2 (1953); Condenser Corp. of Am., 22 N.L.R.B. at 449.
146 27 N.L.R.B. 1100, 1101, n.2 (1940).
147 Id.; see also Liddon White Truck Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 1181, 1182 (1948); Royal
Palm Furniture Factories, Inc., 74 N.L.R.B. 1281, 1282 (1947); Albert Love Enters.,
66 N.L.R.B. 416, 418 (1946).
148 NLRB v. Pease Oil Co., 279 F.2d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 1960) ("Early in its
history, however, the Board came to the conclusion that if it were to take cognizance
of all complaints within its statutory grant of power it would be unable to decide any
complaint with the thoroughness and promptitude necessary to achieve the
objectives of the Act.'); see also NLRB v. Marinor Inns, Inc., 445 F.2d 538, 541 (5th
Cir. 1971). At first, the statutory basis for the NLRB's discretion to refuse
jurisdiction over certain classes of cases was uncertain. The NLRA states that the
NLRB is "empowered" to prevent unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2000).
With respect to representation proceedings, the Act states that the NLRB "shall"
conduct a hearing if it has 'reasonable cause to believe" the matter affects
commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1). The Supreme Court, having declared the NLRB's
statutory jurisdiction in all cases involving more than "de minimis" effect on
commerce, acknowledged the NLRB's discretion to decline jurisdiction in Polish Nat.
Alliance of U.S. v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 648 (1944).
149 See, e.g., Victor Hosiery Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 195, 196-97 (1949); N. B. Quarles,
83 N.L.R.B. 697, 708 (1949); N. Memphis Lumber Co. 81 N.L.R.B. 745, 746 (1949);
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Hartley Act of 1947, but demanded objective standards to
distinguish "employers" by "class or category" according to their
likely impact in commerce.1 50 Three years later the Board
declared fixed, objective, employer-based standards for declining
jurisdiction, 151 and it was only then that single employer doctrine
became an essential part of the rules for the Board's
discretionary jurisdiction.
The Board's employer standards for discretionary
jurisdiction constitute a small firm exemption. Owing perhaps to
their original purpose-to measure the prospective impact on
commerce-the standards for most industries are based on the
dollar volume of a firm's business, rather than the number of its
employees. A firm with few employees but revenues in excess of
the applicable threshold cannot claim an exemption, while a firm
with revenue below the applicable threshold might be exempt no
matter how many workers it employs. 152 The single employer
doctrine, however, reclaims many small firms for the Board's
jurisdiction, just as it extends jurisdiction under Title VII. A
separately incorporated firm with little revenue might be
combined with affiliated corporations, and together these
G. E. Tyner & A. Petrus, 81 N.L.R.B. 380, 381 (1949); A. B. Fletcher, 78 N.L.R.B.
1215, 1215 n.2 (1948).
150 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, 151
(1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (2000)).
151 See Hollow Tree Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 635 (1950):
The Board has determined that it will exercise jurisdiction over those
enterprises which affect commerce by virtue of the fact that they furnish
goods or services necessary to the operations of other employers engaged in
commerce, without regard to other factors, where such goods or services are
valued at $50,000 per annum or more, and are sold to: (a) public utilities or
transit systems; (b) companies which function as instrumentalities and
channels of interstate and foreign commerce and their essential links; or (c)
enterprises engaged in producing or handling goods destined for
out-of-State shipment, or performing services outside the State, in the
value of $25,000 per annum or more. This standard reflects, in large
measure, the results reached in the Board's past decisions disposing of
similar jurisdictional issues.
Id. at 636. Thereafter, the Board developed more specialized standards for particular
industries. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 2152-53 (Patrick Hardin & John E.
Higgins eds., 2001).
152 See, e.g., Sioux Valley Empire Elec. Ass'n, 122 N.L.R.B. 92, 93-94 (1958)
('The Board has decided that it will assert jurisdiction over all public utilities which
do a gross volume of business of at least $250,000 per annum or which have an
outflow or inflow of goods, materials or services, whether directly or indirectly across
State lines, of $50,000 or more per annum.').
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corporations might surpass the Board's specific revenue
threshold for that particular industry.
In some ways, the NLRB's use of the single employer
doctrine for reasserting its jurisdiction has been particularly
aggressive. In particular, the Board has not always required
that the entities constituting a single employer share any
common ownership. 153 This practice by the Board stems from the
ultimate question of jurisdiction: whether there was a labor
dispute "affecting commerce." For purposes of predicting the
effect of a labor dispute on commerce, common ownership of
firms may be much less important than other forms of
interdependence. For example, the Board has sometimes
measured the combined effect on commerce of separately owned
restaurants and motels that occupied the same physical
structure. 154 Similarly, in the construction industry, in which a
multitude of independently owned companies might participate
in a single large construction enterprise, the Board and the
courts have applied the single employer doctrine without
evidence of common ownership. 155
Was the Board's further development of the single employer
doctrine for purposes of discretionary jurisdiction consistent with
Congress' demand for objective standards based on "employer"
class and category? The answer depends at least in part on what
Congress might have meant by "employer" when it enacted the
Taft-Hartley Act. Significantly, Section 501 of the Taft-Hartley
Act provided that the term "employer" would have "the same
meaning" as in the Wagner Act,' 56 and by 1947, the NLRB was
clear in its view of the Wagner Act that an "employer" could be
more than one corporation. Arguably, Congress implicitly
endorsed the single employer doctrine. At the very least,
Congress missed a ripe occasion to object.
Following the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board and the courts
found at least two other uses for the single employer doctrine in
153 See Dearborn Oil & Gas Corp., 125 N.L.R.B. 645, 651 (1959) (highlighting
prior decisions by the Board, in which two or more entities were considered a single
employer in the absence of common ownership).
154 See, e.g., NLRB v. Marinor Inns, Inc., 445 F.2d 538, 540 (5th Cir. 1971);
Seeler v. Williams, No. 77-CV-333, 1977 WL 1810 at *5-6, *8 (N.D.N.Y. 1977)
(granting the Board a temporary injunction against a restaurant).
155 See, e.g., NLRB v. Reed, 206 F.2d 184, 186-88 (9th Cir. 1953).
156 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, § 501(3), 61 Stat.
136, 161 (1947).
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the law of collective bargaining. First, the NLRB and the courts
used the doctrine to extend duties under one corporation's
collective bargaining agreement to an affiliated corporation that
shared control over an interrelated workforce. 157 Second, the
Board and the federal courts used the single employer doctrine in
secondary boycott cases in the same fashion as state courts
before the Taft-Hartley Act, holding that picketing was not
"secondary" if the putative neutral was part of an integrated
enterprise combining the primary employer and the putative
neutral. 158
By the time Congress had begun the debates leading to the
enactment of Title VII, the single employer doctrine was in full
flower, and the issue of its validity was reaching a crescendo. In
late 1963, the Supreme Court of Alabama issued what appeared
to be a rejection of the single employer doctrine in Broadcast
Service of Mobile, Inc. v. Local 1264, International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers.159 In that case, the Alabama court held that
an employer involved in a certain labor dispute was too small to
come within the bounds of the NLRB's discretionary jurisdiction,
and therefore federal law did not preempt the exercise of state
court jurisdiction over the matter. 160 The union involved in the
dispute filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, and its petition
was before the U.S. Supreme Court at the very time Congress
was debating Title VII and the proposed small firm exemption.' 61
157 See, e.g., Local 705, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Willett, Inc.,
614 F. Supp. 932, 933, 939 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (stating that there need not be separate
bargaining agreements for "alter ego[s]" of a corporation); see generally Befort, supra
note 23, at 70-71 (discussing the single employer doctrine and alter ego theory as
means to extend the original bargaining agreement to new companies).
158 See Limbach Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers International Association, 949 F.2d
1241, 1248 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that there must be "separate employers" to have a
secondary boycott); Bowater S.S. Co. v. Patterson, 303 F.2d 369, 375 (2d Cir. 1962)
(holding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act precluded a shipowner's petition for an
injunction against picketing motivated by the union's dispute with an affiliated
foreign corporation); Local No. 24, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB,
266 F.2d 675, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (finding that a company's relationship with its
drivers was "so intertwined with respect to employment" that there could be no
secondary boycott); Penello ex rel. NLRB v. American Federation of Television &
Radio Artists Washington-Baltimore Local, 291 F. Supp. 409, 411-13 (D. Md. 1968)
(discussing whether competing newspapers could be considered one entity for the
purpose of a labor dispute); see generally Befort, supra note 23, at 75-76.
159 159 So.2d 452 (1963).
160 See id. at 455-57.
161 The importance of the issue and the Court's interest in the case was signaled
by its June 1, 1964 order inviting the Solicitor General to file a brief in the case.
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The Court granted the union's petition three months after
Congress enacted Title VII,162 and in early 1965 the Court
reversed the Alabama court in a terse, two paragraph opinion:
[I]n determining the relevant employer, the Board considers
several nominally separate business entities to be a single
employer where they comprise an integrated enterprise. The
controlling criteria, set out and elaborated in Board decisions,
are interrelation of operations, common management,
centralized control of labor relations and common ownership.
The record made below is more than adequate to show that all
of these factors are present [in this case] .163
Having approved the application of the single employer test,
the Court held that federal law preempted the application of the
Alabama law to the labor dispute. 164  The Court's opinion
appeared to take the single employer doctrine for granted, for
purposes of preemption, and without considering any issue as to
its legitimacy. Nevertheless, the Court's opinion is a measure of
the maturity the doctrine had achieved even before the question
had reached the Court.
In sum, by 1964 the single employer doctrine was a widely
acknowledged part of the law that was the backdrop for the
enactment of Title VII. True, the leading proponent of the
doctrine-the NLRB-had used the doctrine only in cases
involving some aspect of collective bargaining law, but the
Board's original and most frequent uses of the doctrine were to
extend the reach of its statutory jurisdiction and to limit the
availability of the small firm exemptions in its "employer"
standards of coverage. In other words, the Board had used the
doctrine in ways that were not at all peculiar to collective
bargaining law. In fact, the Board's use of the doctrine was very
similar to the doctrine's potential use in Title VII cases.
Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broad. Serv. of
Mobile, Inc., 377 U.S. 950, 950 (1964).
162 Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broad. Serv.
of Mobile, Inc., 379 U.S. 812, 812 (1964).
163 Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broad. Serv.
of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256-57 (1965) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
164 Id. A decade later, the Court upheld the application of the single employer
doctrine to bind a corporation to an affiliated corporation's collective bargaining
agreement, conditioned on a determination that the employees of the two firms
constituted an appropriate bargaining unit. See S. Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local No.
627, International Union of Operating Engineers, 425 U.S. 800, 803-04 (1976) (per
curiam).
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Congress had implicitly endorsed the Board's concept of
"employer" in the Taft-Hartley Act, and the courts had shown no
resistance to the doctrine in principle. The Supreme Court's
casual and unanimous endorsement of the doctrine a few months
after the enactment of Title VII reflects the doctrine's general
acceptance in the law during the time of the Title VII-small firm
exemption debates.
C. Other Single Employer Rules Before 1964
While the NLRB provided ample precedent for a single
employer doctrine, the Board's use of the doctrine was
necessarily limited to collective bargaining law. If NLRB case
law and the handful of secondary boycott and Federal Employers'
Liability Act cases were the only historical precedents, one might
still question whether lawmakers would have expected the
doctrine to be part of Title VII. In fact, however, the doctrine had
migrated into other spheres of employment law well before 1964.
Two New Deal-era laws in particular presented occasions for the
further development of the doctrine.
The first of these New Deal-era laws was the Social Security
Act of 1935,165 which gave birth to a federal-state partnership for
the funding and administration of the unemployment
compensation system. The Act funded the system by a payroll
tax, but it offered a small firm exemption for an employer of
fewer than eight employees. 66 The Act gave no directions for
combining affiliated firms for purposes of counting employees.
By design, however, primary responsibility for collecting taxes
and administering the system fell to the states. Many of the
legislatures that adopted implementing legislation foresaw the
problem: What if a single owner or group of owners were
organized into separate entities with separate payrolls? The
statutory solution adopted by many states required counting all
employees of a group of entities "owned or controlled by legally
enforceable means or otherwise, directly or indirectly, by the
same interests .... "167 These statutes provoked substantial
litigation during the late nineteen thirties until the late nineteen
165 Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 301 et seq.).
166 § 907(a), 49 Stat. at 642.
167 Kellogg v. Murphy, 349 Mo. 1165, 1171 (1942) (quoting the provisions of
what was then Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9432(h)).
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forties, with some employers challenging the single employer rule
as part of a broad equal protection attack against the
unemployment compensation scheme, and others questioning
whether the single employer proviso implicitly required proof of
unified or interrelated operations.168 Litigation over the single
employer proviso subsided as Congress and the states gradually
repealed the small firm exemptions for payroll taxes.
Yet another New Deal-era law that eventually led to a
variation of the single employer doctrine was the FLSA. 169 As
originally enacted, the FLSA lacked an exemption specifically
designed for small firms, but most small firms would have fallen
outside the scope of coverage for any of several reasons.
Coverage actually depended on the character of an employee's
work, and whether he was personally "engaged in commerce or in
the production of goods for commerce. '" 70 Under this employee-
based system of coverage, an employer of any size might find
some of its employees within the coverage of the Act, and some of
its employees outside the coverage of the Act. Even the smallest
of firms might be subject to coverage with respect to at least one
employee. Despite the Supreme Court's groundbreaking decision
168 Id. at 1173-77 (describing many of the earlieset cases); see also Teets v.
Leach, 148 P.2d 365, 366, 368-69 (Colo. 1944) (upholding a finding that a
manufacturing company and a realty company were not one employer under the
state compensation act); Karlson v. Murphy, 56 N.E.2d 839, 844-45 (Ill. 1944)
(holding that a partnership was a single employer notwithstanding the death and
withdrawal of certain partners); Lindley v. Murphy, 56 N.E.2d 832, 836-37 (Ill.
1944) (holding that a partnership, despite reorganization, was a single employer);
Huiet v. Dayan, 24 S.E.2d 728, 731-32 (Ga. 1943) (finding that two partnerships
were separate employers because there was no common controlling interest); State
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Unemployment Comp. Div. v. Warrior Petroleum Co.,
46 N.E.2d 827, 829 (Ind. 1943) (finding two employers to be separate employers
because there was no common controlling interest); State ex rel. Okl. Employment
Sec. Comm'n v. Tulsa Flower Exch., 135 P.2d 46, 46-47 (Okla. 1943) (finding that
two companies were separate units).
169 Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.).
170 Id. at § 6, 52 Stat. at 1062-63; see Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126,
130-31 (1944); Walling v. Paramount-Richards Theatres, 61 F. Supp. 290, 303 (E.D.
La. 1945) ('IT]he application of the Act depends on the character of the employee's
activities rather than on the nature of the employer's business.'). As a practical
matter, the nature and size of an employer's business was very important to the
proof of any employee's involvement in interstate commerce. See, e.g., Aetna Fin. Co.
v. Mitchell, 247 F.2d 190, 191-93 (1st Cir. 1957) (discussing the nature of the
employer's business as a credit company in finding that the employees were covered
under the Act).
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in Jones & Laughlin Steel1 71 the year before, however, it was still
widely expected that a great deal of business activity would not
count as 'interstate commerce."1 72  For example, Congress
evidently assumed that employees of many small firms in the
construction and repair industry would fall outside the reach of
the Act. 173 Many other small businesses (as well as some very
large ones) could take refuge in an exemption for "any employee
engaged in any retail or service establishment the greater part of
whose selling or servicing is in intrastate commerce."174 A small
firm unable to prove this exemption for its employees might still
turn to any one of a series of other specialized exemptions
tending to benefit mainly small firms. 175
Initially, therefore, a small firm exemption might have
seemed superfluous, and the omission of a small firm exemption
substantially obviated the need for a rule for treating multiple
entities as if they were one. 76 An employer's affiliation with
other corporations was often part of the proof of an employee's
participation in commerce, 177 but the same result could usually
be achieved by showing the employer's relationship with
independent out-of-state customers or suppliers. A more
important early use for a single employer or integrated
171 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1936).
172 See Reich v. Gateway Press, Inc., 13 F.3d 685, 694 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting the
"mom and pop" exception to FLSA); NLRB v. Dixie Terminal Co., 210 F.2d 538, 540
(6th Cir. 1954) (comparing jurisdiction under the NLRA with jurisdiction under the
FLSA, and concluding that the FLSA's employee-based coverage is more limited
than the NLRA's labor dispute coverage); Linder, supra note 13, at 417, 423-24.
173 See Wells v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, 6 F.R.D. 606, 607-08 (W.D. Ky. 1943)
(rejecting the plaintiffs 'unitary enterprise" theory for regarding construction
workers as "engaged in commerce" based on the prospective business of the factory
they were building).
174 Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, § 13(a), 52 Stat. at 1067 (repealed 2004).
175 See id.
176 See Mitchell v. Household Fin. Corp., 208 F.2d 667, 671 (3d Cir. 1953)
(rejecting theory that employees were engaged in commerce simply because the
corporation that employed them was part of a larger interstate enterprise); De Loach
v. Crowley's, Inc., 128 F.2d 378, 379-80 (5th Cir. 1942) (stating that whether
subsidiary was part of a single enterprise with parent was unimportant to whether
employees who handled goods passing from one to the other were engaged in
interstate commerce).
177 See, e.g., Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Wirtz, 346 F.2d 340, 342 (7th Cir. 1965)
(noting interactions among finance companies when ascertaining participation in
commerce); Walling v. Paramount-Richards Theatres, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 290, 302-04
(E.D. La. 1945) (noting that defendant's employees provided services to six
establishments when ascertaining their participation in commerce).
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enterprise doctrine was to extend liability beyond the nominal
employer to its affiliates. In Rutherford Food Corp. v.
McComb, 178 for example, the Supreme Court held that the
Secretary of Labor was entitled to injunctive relief against one or
both of two affiliated corporations with respect to the
employment of boner crews within a slaughterhouse owned by
one of the corporations. 179 The specific issue before the Court
was whether the boner crews were "employees" of either
corporation, or whether the crews were employees of a putative
independent contractor.180 The Court specifically declined to
reach the questions whether both corporations were employers or
whether they constituted a single employer.18' Nevertheless, in
stressing that employment relations should be judged in light of
"economic realities,"'8 2 that the boning work was "a part of the
integrated unit of production,'18 3 and that the boners "were
employees of the establishment,'18 4 the Court lent support to the
concept of an employer enterprise that transcends formal
corporate organization.
A single employer rule for purposes of coverage became
especially important with the 1961 Amendments, 8 5 which
created the justification for a true small firm exemption and the
need for a rule for identifying the entity to be measured. First,
Congress repealed the broad exemption for employees of retail
and service establishments, particularly to extend the Act's reach
to employees of large nationwide retailers, but also eliminating
the refuge that had protected many small firms. 8 6 In place of
the old exemption, Congress provided a new exemption based on
the revenues of the employer "enterprise.'18 7 The purpose of the
new exemption was to sort "mom and pop" businesses from larger
178 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
179 Id. at 726-27, 730-31.
180 Id. at 727-28.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 727 (quoting Walling v. Rutherford Food Corp., 156 F.2d 513, 516
(10th Cir. 1946)).
183 Id. at 729.
184 Id.
185 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No 87-30, 75 Stat. 65
(1961) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000)).
186 Reich v. Gateway Press, Inc., 13 F.3d 685, 694-95 (3d Cir. 1994); S. REP. No.
87-145 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1620, 1621, 1644-46.
187 Reich, 13 F.3d at 694.
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ones.188 Qualification for the exemption, however, depended on
identification of the "enterprise," which might be greater or less
than a single corporation.
The concept of an employer "enterprise" was also the focus of
a new alternative basis for coverage. After 1961, an employee
enjoyed the protection of the law if he was personally engaged in
interstate commerce, or if he was employed in an "enterprise"
engaged in commerce.18 9 Again, the concept of an "enterprise"
suggested something possibly larger than a single legal person or
entity.
The amendments defined "enterprise" for both purposes as
the related activities performed (either through unified
operation or common control) by any person or persons for a
common business purpose, and includes all such activities
whether performed in one or more establishments or by one or
more corporate or other organizational units including
departments of an establishment operated through leasing
arrangements, but shall not include the related activities
performed for such enterprise by an independent
contractor .... 190
From this definition, the courts distilled three elements that
closely resemble the elements of the single employer doctrine of
collective bargaining law: 1) the entities allegedly constituting a
single enterprise are "engaged in related activities," 2) they are
"under unified operation or common control," and 3) they 'have a
common business purpose. "191
One might ask why Congress was not content on this
occasion to adopt, explicitly or implicitly, the existing single
employer doctrine from collective bargaining law. Evidently, the
drafters sought a rule that was both more far-reaching and more
precisely targeted than the collective bargaining rule. On the
one hand, an enterprise might be a mere division of a
corporation, which was engaged in more than one distinct and
188 Id. (quoting Martin v. Bedell, 955 F.2d 1029, 1032 (5th Cir. 1992)).
189 See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, 75 Stat. at 65 (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 206(b)) (emphasis added).
190 Id. (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 203(r)) (emphasis added). The definition of
"enterprise" goes on to exclude independently owned retail and service businesses
that are part of franchising, distributorship and similar relationships. Id.
191 Reich, 13 F.3d at 694; Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping, Inc., 932 F.2d 218, 229
(3d Cir. 1991).
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unrelated business. 192  On the other hand, the statutory
definition of "enterprise" permitted aggregation of separate
entities based on "unified operation" in lieu of "common
control,' 93 and it did not require proof of common labor relations.
The result was to extend the reach of the Act to very small
corporations, provided they were part of an integrated
"enterprise" that exceeded the statutory threshold.
The development of rules for aggregating separately
organized firms under the FLSA and the Social Security Court is
one more part of the background that illuminates Congress'
intent in the small firm exemption of Title VII. By 1964, it was
perfectly normal to treat multiple affiliated entities as a single
employer for purposes of statutory coverage under employee
protective legislation, either according to the federal common law
that had evolved since the beginning of the century, or according
to fine-tuned statutory rules. Most importantly, Congress'
debate over firm aggregation for FLSA purposes reached its
culmination just as Congress was beginning the debate over a
new civil rights law, and only three years before the enactment of
Title VII.
D. Early State Civil Rights Laws and the Single Employer
Doctrine
There is one last stage prop for Congress' debate over Title
VII and the small firm exemption: discrimination law. Congress
did not write Title VII on a blank page. Many of the Act's
provisions were modeled after state civil rights laws enacted
during the post-War and early civil rights eras. The states took a
variety of approaches to the omnipresent issues of whether small
firms should be exempt and what number of employees should
mark the cutoff. In some states there was no small firm
exemption at all. In some others the threshold was so low that
there was little work for a single employer doctrine.
Enforcement was largely administrative in the early days and
was not particularly vigorous. Southern states passed no civil
rights laws at all. Nevertheless, at least some state authorities
were conscious of the single employer doctrine and expected to
apply the doctrine in an appropriate case. As early as 1948, the
192 S. REP. No. 87-145 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1620, 1660.
193 Id.
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New York State Commission Against Discrimination took the
position that if a single individual owned several businesses, the
employees of all businesses would count in determining the
applicability of New York's small employer exemption. 194 In
1963, the Legal Counsel for California's Fair Employment
Practices Commission opined in an interview that California
would follow New York's approach and aggregate affiliated
firms. 195
Congress was not necessarily aware of these additional
pronouncements of the single employer doctrine in state
discrimination law. There does not appear to have been any
reported testing of the single employer doctrine in state
discrimination law before 1964. On the other hand, the
declarations of state civil rights authorities in the years before
Title VII evidences the strength and obviousness of the
connection between a small firm exemption and the increasingly
routine practice of treating some affiliated firms as if they were
one employer.
III. IS THE SINGLE EMPLOYER DOCTRINE CONSISTENT WITH THE
TERMS AND HISTORY OF TITLE VII?
A. The Text as Enacted in 1964
It is clear enough that persons familiar with labor law in
1964 would have been aware of the single employer doctrine and
its importance in matters of statutory coverage, especially as a
limit against a small firm exemption. Consider what had
happened or was happening by the time of the 1964
congressional proceedings: (1) the single employer doctrine had
developed as an important and well-known limit on small firm
exemptions in federal collective bargaining law, state
unemployment compensation laws, and the FLSA; (2) as recently
as 1961 Congress had debated the best design for a statutory
version of the doctrine for the FLSA; (3) the viability of the non-
statutory version of the single employer doctrine was pending
before the U.S. Supreme Court; and (4) state administrative
194 Michael C. Tobriner, California FEPC, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 333, 342-43 (1965)
(citing NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, REPORT ON
PROGRESS 45 (1948)).
195 Tobriner, supra note 194, at 342-43. The interview was dated August 15,
1963. Id. at 342 n.74. The article describing the interview was published in 1965.
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agencies that had taken the lead in anti-discrimination law had
predicted that the single employer doctrine would limit local
versions of the small firm exemption.
Then there is the record of Congress' debate. Unfortunately,
while Congress vigorously debated the small firm exemption, its
attention was riveted to the question of what number of
employees should be the threshold. 196 The question whether the
single employer doctrine would limit the exemption was not a
significant part of the public debate. On the other hand, there is
evidence that Congress expected that the doctrine would apply.
Senator Stennis, an opponent of the Civil Rights Act, warned
that many small businesses might be surprised to learn that they
were included in the coverage of Title VII. To make his point, he
recalled that many businesses were already subject to executive
orders requiring nondiscrimination in the performance of federal
contracts, and he related the following:
I received many telephone calls from.., small manufacturing
operations in Mississippi that did not sell the Federal
Government $1 worth of their products, but happened to be
owned by a company.., which did do business with the
Government. It was insisted that they submit to certain
formulas for which there was no authority, and furthermore
there was no connection with the Federal Government in what
was being manufactured, except a remote affinity with a chain
company.197
In the face of this evidence of Congress' awareness of the
problem, one might still argue that Congress dodged the issue,
choosing not to address what might have been a difficult issue for
legislation that was already especially challenging for politicians.
Silence might imply acquiescence in the doctrine, but there is
also an argument to be made for the opposite conclusion. If the
single employer doctrine is strong, so too is the 'bedrock" rule
that a separately organized corporate entity is a separate
person. 198 If Title VII is silent, as the critics have assumed,
perhaps silence implies adoption of the usual law of corporations,
not the law of employment.
196 See infra text accompanying notes 315-320.
197 110 CONG. REC. S7073 (1964) (statement of Sen. Stennis) (emphasis added).
Senator Stennis' later description of the same problem for one of his constituents
appears to be a repetition of the same story. 110 CONG. REC. S7087 (1964)
(statement of Sen. Stennis).
198 See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61-62 (1998).
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Congress was not completely silent, however. The proper
starting point for understanding the concept of the "employer" in
Title VII is not the statutory definition of "employer." Rather,
one must begin with an examination of the statutory definition of
"person," which happens to be the very first term in Title
VII's list of definitions. Title VII's definition of "person" is
out of the ordinary: 'The term 'person' includes one or more
individuals, ... labor unions, partnerships, associations,
corporations, legal representatives, mutual companies,
joint-stock companies, trusts, [and] unincorporated
organizations . . . . "199 This definition of "person" is striking
because it includes the plural form of entities that ordinarily
qualify as persons on an individualized basis. Two individuals
could be a "person," which would not be surprising in the case of
a partnership except that the definition redundantly lists
"partnerships" (plural) as another type of "person." More
importantly, "person" includes "one or more ... corporations." A
"person" is not necessarily a covered "employer." It must have
fifteen employees in the case of Title VII. But if the person in
question consists of more than one corporation, the sum of these
corporations' workforces evidently would determine whether the
"person" was a covered employer or an exempt small firm.
One might object that Title VII's definition of "person" is
more likely careless drafting than a purposeful abrogation
of the usual laws of incorporation. After all, if "one or
more ... corporations" could be a single "person," how are we to
know whether any particular set of corporations constitute that
person? The single employer doctrine likely would have come to
mind to anyone considering the matter carefully and knowingly
in 1964.
Yet there is another confusing signal in the record, and at
first glance it might appear to lead in a different direction. A
House Judiciary Committee report explained as follows: 'The
terms 'person,' 'employee,' 'commerce,' 'industry affecting
commerce,' and 'State' are defined.., in the manner common for
Federal statutes.'"00 This statement seems completely wrong, at
least with respect to the definition of "person." Title VII's
definition of "person" is quite uncommon in comparison with
199 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
200 H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 27 (1963), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
TITLES VII AND XI, supra note 34, at 2027 (emphasis added).
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"Federal statutes" in general. The more important message of
the Committee report, however, is that the definition of "person"
is borrowed, not written from scratch. And Congress' choice of
models from which to borrow its definition of '"person" is
revealing. If Congress had intended that one corporation would
equal one person under Title VII, it could have borrowed from
one of the many "common" statutes that define a "person" as an
'Individual" or a "corporation" (singular).2 1 Instead, the drafters
copied language from the Wagner Act.
In language identical in pertinent respects to Title VII, the
Wagner Act provides that "'person' includes one or more
individuals, labor organizations, partnerships, associations,
corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in cases
under [T]itle 11, or receivers. 202
As noted earlier, this Wagner Act definition of "person" was
the only plausible statutory basis for the early NLRB decisions
invoking the single employer doctrine. 203 Indeed, this provision
is all that the NLRB has ever cited in support of the doctrine
beyond its own authority to invent a new common law of
201 This can be compared with the usual definition of "person." See
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21). 'The term 'person' means an individual, firm [or]
corporation .. " Id. In Bestfoods, the Court considered the circumstances under
which a corporation might be held liable as an "operator" of a facility owned by its
subsidiary. The Court, having specifically cited § 9601(21), stated, 'It is a general
principle ... that a parent corporation (so-called because of control through
ownership of another corporation's stock) is not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries."
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 61. The Court further found that 'nothing in CERCLA
purports to reject this bedrock principle." Id. at 62. The key difference between
CERCLA's definition of "person" and Title VII's definition is that CERCLA refers to
a corporation in the singular form as a type of person.
There are also a number of labor laws that define "person" in the usual sense,
and some of these laws predate Title VII and were available as models when
Congress enacted Title VII. See, e,g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(a)
(2000) (defining "person" to mean "an individual, partnership, association, [or]
corporation'); see also Anti-Kickback Act, 41 U.S.C. § 52(3) (2000) (defining "Person"
to mean "a corporation, partnership, business association of any kind, trust, joint-
stock company, or individual').
202 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (emphasis added). The same definition of "Person" may be
found in two other pre-Title VII employee relations statutes. The first was the
Walsh-Healey Act of 1936, ch. 881, 49 Stat. 2036 (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C.
§ 41 (2000)). The second was the Landrum Griffin Act of 1959, Pub. L. 86-257, § 3(d),
73 Stat. 519, 520 (1959), which primarily addressed union governance and relations
between a union and its members, but which also amended the National Labor
Relations Act.
203 See supra text accompanying notes 114-115.
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collective bargaining. Not surprisingly, some of the first courts to
invoke the single employer doctrine in Title VII cases cited the
corresponding provision of Title VII.204
A clearer statement by Congress as to the single employer
doctrine would have avoided the current uncertainty among the
courts. It is important to remember, however, that in 1964
experience under the Wagner Act suggested that no clearer
statement was necessary. The NLRB had established a
considerable body of law for the single employer doctrine for an
analogous purpose, with little controversy, and with no greater
statutory support than Title VII provided for the EEOC or the
courts. It would have been reasonable to assume that the EEOC
and the courts would develop a similar body of law suitably
tailored to Title VII. As explained in the next section, that is
exactly what happened during the first twenty years after Title
VII.
B. Developments After 1964
If Congress had failed to state the single employer doctrine
any more clearly during the four decades that followed Title VII,
its silence in the face of EEOC and judicial endorsements would
count for something. In fact, Congress has not been altogether
silent. It has returned to Title VII on several occasions,
substantially amending the Act twice, but never even debating,
let alone overruling, the single employer doctrine.
Admittedly, by the time of Congress' next close look at
discrimination law in 1972, administrative and judicial
applications of the single employer doctrine in Title VII cases
were scant. The earliest reported applications of the single
employer doctrine under Title VII were in EEOC administrative
proceedings, beginning in 1970.205 The first reported judicial
application of the doctrine was not until early 1972, in Williams
v. New Orleans Steamship Ass'n.20 6  Moreover, the initial
204 See, e.g., Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1336 (6th Cir. 1983),
overruled by Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1242 (2006); Hague v. Spencer
Turbine Co., 28 FEP Cases 450, 451-52 & n.3 (M.D.N.C. 1982).
205 See EEOC Dec. No. 71-1677, 3 FEP Cases 1242, 1242 (Apr. 12, 1971); EEOC
Dec. No. 71-1537, 1 E.P.D. 6235 (March 3, 1971); EEOC Dec. No. 71-2598, 4 FEP
Cases 21, 22 (June 22, 1970).
206 341 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. La. 1972); see id. at 615-16 (aggregating twelve
defendant member companies as a single employer to meet the requisite number of
employees required by Title VII).
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response of the courts was not unanimous. In Hassell v. Harmon
Foods, Inc.,20 7 a district court rejected the plaintiffs single
employer theory for overcoming a small firm exemption, seeing
,nothing" in Title VII or its history to support the doctrine. 208
The Sixth Circuit affirmed in a terse per curium opinion, 20 9 but
reversed course a few years later in Armbruster v. Quinn,210
noting among other things Title VII's definition of "person" as
including "corporations.'2 11
In short, however, when Congress returned to the subject of
the small firm exemption in 1972, the single employer doctrine
was only slightly more obvious an issue than it had been in 1964.
As in 1964, the congressional debates of 1972 focused on the
threshold number and avoided more difficult questions about the
rules for identifying an employer entity. Proponents of broader
coverage sought to reduce the threshold to eight employees.21 2 A
compromise reduced the threshold to the current number of
fifteen. 21 3
The balance of judicial authority tipped strongly in favor of
the single employer doctrine over the course of the nineteen-
seventies and early eighties.21 4 In the midst of this period of
207 Hassell v. Harmon Foods, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 432, 433 (W.D. Tenn. 1971),
affd, 454 F.2d 199 (6th Cir. 1972)).
208 Id. at 433 (denying the plaintiffs assertion that the two defendants should
be aggregated as "one" employer).
209 Hassell v. Harmon Foods, Inc., 454 F.2d 199, 200 (6th Cir. 1972).
210 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983), overruled by Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 126 S.
Ct. 1235, 1242 (2006).
211 Id. at 1336-37.
212 See S. 2515, 92d Cong. § 2(b), 117 CONG. REC. 31702 (1971); H.R. 1746, 92d
Cong. § 2(a), 117 CONG. REC. 212 (1971); H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 20, 26 (1972),
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2155, 2161.
213 See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261 § 2(2),
(4), 86 Stat. 103, 103 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000)).
214 In addition to the cases cited above, many other courts recognized the single
employer doctrine. See, e.g., Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 403-05 (5th
Cir. 1983); Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 697 F.2d 1297, 1304 (9th Cir. 1982);
Mas Marques v. Digital Equip. Corp., 637 F.2d 24, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1980) (citing the
doctrine, but finding evidence insufficient to support aggregation of the affiliated
corporations); Baker v. Stuart Broad. Co., 560 F.2d 389, 391-92 (8th Cir. 1977);
Hague v. Spencer Turbine Co., 28 FEP Cases 450, 451-52 (M.D.N.C. 1982);
Odriozola v. Superior Cosmetics Distrib., Inc., 531 F. Supp. 1070, 1074-76 (D.P.R.
1982); EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co., 523 F. Supp. 1256, 1260-63 (N.D. Ohio 1981);
Fike v. Gold Kist, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 722, 725-28 (N.D. Ala. 1981); Copley v. Morality
in Media, Inc., 25 E.P.D. 31,570 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Ratcliffe v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 482
F. Supp. 759, 764-65 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F.
Supp. 715, 719-21 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Black Musicians v. Local 60-471, American
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widespread judicial acceptance of the doctrine, Congress
substantially amended the law again in 1991 to overrule a
number of Supreme Court decisions with which Congress
disagreed.215  Still, Congress did nothing to reject the single
employer doctrine.
To the contrary, over the same period the single employer
doctrine inspired Congress in its enactment of two measures
extending employer-based coverage. In 1984, Congress amended
the ADEA to overrule court decisions refusing to give that law
extraterritorial effect. 216  As amended, the ADEA holds an
American employer responsible for actions of a foreign
corporation under the American corporation's "control."217
Congress' four-factor test of "control" is an unmistakable
restatement of the single employer doctrine: "(A) interrelation of
operations, (B) common management, (C) centralized control of
labor relations, and (D) common ownership or financial
control .... "218 In 1991, Congress amended Title VII in similar
fashion, 219 responding to the Supreme Court's decision in EEOC
v. Arabian American Oil Co. 220  In Arabian American, the
Supreme Court had applied the rule that U.S. law has no
extraterritorial effect in the absence of an express statutory
direction 221 and, unlike the ADEA, Title VII still lacked an
express provision in this regard. Congress' four-factor
restatement of the single employer doctrine provided the
Federation of Musicians, 375 F. Supp. 902, 907-08 (W.D. Pa. 1974);
United States v. Local 638, Enterprise Association of Steam, Hot Water, Hydraulic
Sprinkler, Pneumatic Tube, Compressed Air, Ice Machine, Air Conditioning &
General Pipefitters, 360 F. Supp. 979, 994-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
215 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 105, 107, 109, 105 Stat.
1071, 1071-72, 1074-78 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered chapters of U.S.C.)
(overruling decisions of the Supreme Court with respect to the rules for disparate
impact discrimination, mixed motive cases, and discrimination by foreign
corporations, and also overruling the Court with respect to meaning of the
Reconstruction-era civil rights law, 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
216 See, e.g., Zahourek v. Arthur Young & Co., 750 F.2d 827, 828-29 (10th Cir.
1984) ('We... hold that the Act does not apply to the termination of employment of
an American citizen by an American employer where, as here, the 'work place' is in
Honduras.').
217 Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459, § 802(b)(2),
98 Stat. 1767, 1792 (1984) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(h) (2000)).
218 Id.
219 Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. at 1077 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1).
220 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
221 Id. at 248.
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direction, extending Title VII to foreign corporations through the
American employers who owned them.
There is one other set of developments that supports a
theory of Congress' implicit approval of the single employer
doctrine. The Department of Labor has exercised its authority to
issue regulations under two relatively recent employment laws,
the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988
('WARN Act'), 222 and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
("FMLA'), 223 using the single employer doctrine to resolve
problems of coverage under those laws.224 Both the WARN Act
and the FMLA have small firm exemptions, albeit with much
higher thresholds than Title VII.225 The Department of Labor's
single employer rule is a way of overcoming these exemptions,
just as the doctrine overcomes the small firm exemption under
Title VI1.226 The doctrine's impact on these laws is neither
obscure nor easily overlooked. As of April, 2005, there were fifty-
six judicial decisions listed by Westlaw under the links for the
FMLA regulation, and 100 judicial decisions under the links for
the WARN Act regulation. On the whole, the courts have upheld
the Department's interpretation of these laws, even though
neither law contains an express declaration of the single
employer doctrine. The WARN Act arguably provides better
support for the doctrine, because it defines "employer" as a
'business enterprise" that employs the requisite number of
employees. 227 The FMLA, however, defines an employer as a
"person" with the requisite number of employees, and it defines a
"person" to include a singular "corporation.' 28 The WARN Act
222 Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890 (1988) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-
2109).
223 Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2154).
224 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(2) (2006) (for the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act); 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(c)(2) (2005) (for the Family and Medical Leave
Act).
225 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(1) (100-employee threshold for the Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notification Act); id. § 2611(4)(A) (50-employee threshold for the
Family and Medical Leave Act).
226 The courts have also held that the doctrine might be used to extend liability
to affiliated corporations under the WARN Act. See, e.g., Pearson v. Component
Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 478 (3d Cir. 2001) (adopting the Department of Labor's
multi-factored test for affiliated corporate liability, but holding that the evidence did
not support application of the doctrine).
227 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(1).
228 Id. § 2611(4)(A), (8) (incorporating by reference 29 U.S.C. § 203(a)).
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single employer regulation is now seventeen years old 229 and the
FMLA single employer regulation is thirteen years old. 230
Neither regulation has provoked a discernable reaction in
Congress.
IV. IS THE SINGLE EMPLOYER DOCTRINE CONSISTENT WITH THE
PURPOSE OF THE SMALL FIRM EXEMPTION?
Despite Congress' implied endorsement of a single employer
rule in principle, the lack of an express and precise legislative
statement leaves the courts substantial leeway for shaping the
contours of the doctrine. After all, there is nothing in Title VII,
as enacted in 1964 or as subsequently amended, that compels
any particular version of the doctrine. Moreover, the single
employer doctrine might need tailoring to accommodate it to the
functions of the small firm exemption of discrimination law.
Arguably, this is exactly what Judge Posner and some other
judges have done: They have satisfied the purposes of the small
firm exemption by limiting the single employer doctrine to the
sorts of cases in which it would be appropriate to "pierce the
corporate veil" or hold a corporation accountable for actions in
which it had some actual involvement. In contrast, courts that
favor a robust form of the single employer doctrine may have
overstated Title VII's remedial goals and underestimated the
need for the exemption. Thus, it is important to inquire about
the purposes and merits of the small firm exemption and to ask
what version of the single employer doctrine is most consistent
with congressional intent. As noted earlier, Congressmen who
supported or acquiesced in the exemption in 1964 and again in
1972 articulated five different purposes for the exemption. The
following sections examine these purposes one-by-one in light of
the effect of the single employer doctrine.
A. Relief from Costs of Regulation
1. The Argument for Relief
The most frequently cited purpose for a small firm
exemption is to relieve small firms of disproportionate regulatory
229 54 Fed. Reg. 16070 (Apr. 20, 1989).
230 58 Fed. Reg. 31812 (June 4, 1993).
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costs. 231 Judge Posner, for example, began his opinion in Papa
with the premise that the small firm exemption was to relieve
small firms of the "crushing expense of mastering the intricacies"
of discrimination law. 232 The record of congressional proceedings
leading to Title VII confirms that this was an important
justification for the exemption. 233 The essence of the argument is
that a firm with very few employees lacks the economies of scale
enjoyed by a firm employing a larger workforce. Costs of
learning and implementing the law do not vary in direct
proportion to the number of employees. For example, the cost of
providing sexual harassment training might be nearly the same
whether an employer has ten employees or fifty. A small firm
might bear nearly the same cost as a large firm, and that cost
might be a tolerable burden for the large firm when calculated on
a per employee basis, but for the small firm the same cost would
translate into a much higher cost per employee. 23 4
Making an exemption dependent on the number of a firm's
employees is consistent with a goal of avoiding a disproportionate
burden for small firms. If the exemption depended on revenue
instead of workforce size, an employer-lawyer with two associates
and a secretary might fail to qualify for an exemption in a year in
which the employer-lawyer won a huge contingency fee, even
though the economies of scale would still be very poor for
learning and implementing discrimination laws for three
employees. In contrast, a new but very substantial business
231 The state courts frequently rely on the same rationale when interpreting the
effect of their own small firm exemptions. See, e.g., Brown v. Ford, 905 P.2d 223, 227
(Okla. 1995).
232 Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Tomka
v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991
F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993).
233 See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. S7073 (1964) (statement of Sen. Stennis); 110
CONG. REC. S7074 (1964) (statements of Sen. Stennis and Sen. Long ); 110 CONG.
REC. S13085, 13092 (1964) (statement of Sen. Cotton). The argument was repeated
during the debates preceding the 1972 amendments. 118 CONG. REC. S2387, 2410
(1972) (statements of Sen. Stennis and Sen. Fannin); 118 CONG. REC. 2389-90 (1972)
(statement of Sen. Allen).
234 Employment regulations are not the only costs that fall disproportionately on
small firms. According to a Small Business Research Summary published by the
Small Business Administration, the cost of a variety of government regulations
calculated on a per employee basis is forty-five percent more per employee for very
small firms (employing fewer than twenty employees) than for large firms
(employing more than 500). W. MARK CRAIN, THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS ON
SMALL FIRMS (2005), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs264tot.pdf.
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might be exempt under a revenue-based rule during its first year
when it was hiring thousands of employees if it did not yet have
any sales revenues. Such a firm would escape responsibility for
discrimination in hiring its initial workforce, even though it
enjoyed large firm economies of scale. Thus, an exemption based
on the number of employees makes sense.
Is the cost of not discriminating or learning not to
discriminate truly significant for a small firm? Not
discriminating on the basis of race, sex, or religion might seem
much easier than paying taxes or complying with many other
laws. Time has proved, however, that discrimination law is not
only complex but also difficult to understand and implement. It
is not enough for the owner or top managers of a firm to learn the
law. It must also be learned by every supervisor with authority
to take an adverse employment action against any employee, and
the firm must adopt measures to monitor its supervisors to make
sure they are not discriminating. With the development of
sexual harassment law, an employer probably needs to train even
non-supervisory employees and monitor their social interactions
at the workplace. And sexual harassment law is just one of
several very complex rules of anti-discrimination with which
employers must now contend. One could add disparate impact
theory, interactive reasonable accommodation theory, and
stereotyping or other subconscious bias theories. The enactment
of the ADEA, 235 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 236 and ADA237
have compounded the complexity of the law. The ADA, for
example, requires an employer to understand what mental and
physical conditions constitute protected "disabilities," and to
understand what accommodations are "reasonable"--daunting
tasks even for lawyers and judges.23
A few studies have confirmed that small firms are at a
significant disadvantage in bearing these costs. According to one
study, firms with fewer than twenty employees pay about $920
per employee as a result of "workplace" regulations-which
include wage and hour laws, occupational safety and health laws
and a variety of other regulations-while firms employing more
235 Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
236 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
237 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
238 See id. §§ 12102, 12112-12113.
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than 500 employees pay only $841.239 Presumably, the cost to
small firms and the margin of the large firm advantage would
increase if all small firms, including those employing as few as
fifteen, were suddenly subject to Title VII and the other
discrimination laws. Admittedly, the cost of other regulations is
much greater. Environmental regulations, for example, are
estimated to cost small firms $3,296 per employee, and large
firms only $710 per employee. 240  Beyond the cost of
discrimination law compliance, however, is the potentially
catastrophic cost of litigation defense and liability for a single
discrimination lawsuit.
The potential regulatory burdens suffered by a small firm
are important for several reasons. Disproportionate burdens
might impair its ability to compete, particularly with larger firms
that enjoy better economies of scale. Even if a small firm could
survive the burden (as it frequently does despite many other
disproportionate costs), the small firm might be less likely to hire
additional employees, and the resulting loss in employment
opportunities could hurt the very persons the law was designed
to help. Moreover, a small firm owner experiences regulatory
costs quite differently than owners of a large firm. Many small
firm owners operate their businesses as a source of self-
employment, and not just as an investment. 241 On the other
hand, small business owners do not rely on "wages" or "salary"
like other workers. Frequently, they earn their sustenance from
the profits of the business, which means that they bear all the
risks of business. If competitive pressures prevent a small firm
from passing disproportionate costs on to customers, the impact
has a direct impact on the owner's livelihood.
Moreover, in a very small firm the owner may be a general
manager, front line supervisor, and production worker all in one.
He does not specialize in human resources or administrative
239 U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Office of Advocacy, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://sba.gov/advo/stats/sbfaq.pdf (last updated June 2006) [hereinafter Small Bus.
FAQs]; see also CRAIN, supra note 234, at 5 (finding that small firms bear a per
capita expense of $920 per employee for "workplace regulations" even with the
exemption, while the per capita figure is $1,051 for firms employing 40 to 499
employees, and $841 for firms employing more than 500).
240 Small Bus. FAQs, supra note 245; CRAIN, supra note 234, at 5.
241 See U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, THE SMALL
BUSINESS ECONOMY 7-11 (2005), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research
/sb-econ2005.pdf [hereinafter THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY].
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services, either by training or actual work, and he probably lacks
the resources to employ a specialist. The additional work and
responsibility imposed by any new regulation is not only a
financial burden, it is also a burden on his personal time and
energy. If an applicant or employee sues the small firm, the
owner/manager will also bear the burden in personal time,
energy, and stress in responding to charges, negotiating, and
preparing for trial. The time and energy spent in litigation will
diminish his or her effectiveness as the manager of the business.
If the need for a small firm exemption is so clear, why are
there no small firm exemptions from many other burdensome
regulations? As noted earlier, small firms face particularly high
costs because of environmental regulations. Moreover, small
firms are not exempt from some expensive employment laws,
such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSH Act'). 242
There are several reasons why a small firm exemption might be
inappropriate for these laws.
First, the decision whether to exempt small firms could
reflect a weighing of the costs and benefits of exemption. In the
case of environmental regulations, for example, even a very small
firm could cause catastrophic damage to the community by
pollution or illegal dumping of toxic waste. Violation of
occupational safety and health laws by a very small employer
could cause death, total and permanent disability, or serious
injury. No matter how great the burden of these regulations, it
might make sense to require small firms to comply with the law
even if small firms can no longer compete at all in particularly
hazardous industries. In contrast, the harm caused by small
firm discrimination is contained. An adverse employment
decision, while harmful, is not fatal, and its effects are not likely
to reach beyond the size of the employer's small workforce unless
all small firms discriminate in unison. In general, the jobs from
which minorities might be wrongfully excluded in small firms
tend to be at the bottom rung rather than the top. Small firms
offer lower pay, fewer benefits, and less job security than larger
firms. 2
4 3
A second reason why an exemption might be more
appropriate for discrimination law than other for laws is that an
242 See Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000).
243 See BROWN, HAMILTON & MEDOFF, supra note 12, at 29-54.
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employer faces a different set of costs and risks in defending
against discrimination claims. The issue whether an employer
violated a safety or environmental standard usually depends on
objective, physical evidence. Either the employer provided
protective gear or he did not, and the outcome is not likely to
depend on speculation about the employer's state of mind.
Discrimination laws, however, provide a plausible basis for
argument in many cases in which the evidence is mainly
subjective and circumstantial. Even if the employer had a
legitimate reason for an adverse action, the employer could still
be liable if prejudice was one of the "motivating factor[s]."244 The
employer may have to prove a speculative proposition, that it
would have taken the same action regardless of the employer's
discriminatory motive. 245  Proving or disproving all the
circumstances and motivations for the employer's decision can
involve many easily disputed facts. Defending against a
discrimination claim is not only expensive, but frequently
uncertain, and the ultimate resolution is often in the hands of a
jury.
The mixed motive doctrine presents another special risk for
the owner whose business is his or employment and livelihood.
In a very small business, the owner usually must take personal
responsibility for nearly any significant employment decision.
An allegedly discriminatory past act or a past unguarded
outburst of prejudice could be circumstantial evidence enough to
persuade a fact finder that discrimination was a "motivating
factor." In larger organization, a manager with a troubled past
might be terminated, assigned to non-supervisory work, or
subjected to careful oversight with respect to employment
decisions. In the case of a very small business, however, the only
sure way for the owner to avoid the risk of a "motivating factor"
charge is to sell or liquidate the business.
Still another reason why small firms may have a special
need for exemption from discrimination laws has to do with the
manner in which discrimination laws are enforced. Employment
laws can be roughly divided into those which provide for private
enforcement, and those which do not. The OSH Act, which lacks
a small firm exemption, 246 is an example of a law with very little
244 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).
245 See id.
246 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678.
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private enforcement. It is enforced almost exclusively by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration ('"SHA'), a
division of the Department of Labor.247 OSHA must take care not
to antagonize small business interest groups that enjoy
considerable influence in Washington and that have succeeded in
limiting OSHA's powers in the past.248 If OSHA decides not to
pursue a particular matter or theory or to moderate its demands
against an employer, OSHA's decision is usually the end of the
matter. There is very little opportunity for private enforcement
of the OSH Act's provisions. 249
In contrast, all the major discrimination laws permit private
enforcement. Initial enforcement authority lies in the EEOC, an
independent agency.250 Proponents of the small firm exemption
for Title VII worried that small firms would be at a distinct
disadvantage in dealing with what they feared would be a
fearsome bureaucracy. 251 In actual practice, the EEOC has been
just as important as a facilitator of private enforcement as an
instigator of public enforcement. The EEOC offers a charging
party a means of preliminary investigation of the possibility of
unlawful discrimination at no cost to the employee. Regardless
of whether the EEOC finds "reasonable cause" to believe the
employer unlawfully discriminated,252 however, the individual
employee decides for himself whether to sue, what theories to
pursue, what remedies to seek, and whether to settle for any
particular terms.253 Even if the employee is unable to find an
attorney willing to accept his case, Title VII provides that "the
court may appoint an attorney" for the employee and "authorize
the commencement of the action without the payment of fees,
247 See id. §§ 651-652, 656-658.
248 See MARK ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAw 762-63 (5th
ed. 2003).
249 The opportunities for employees to challenge OSHA's lack of vigor in
enforcement are quite limited. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (allowing an employee to
challenge the time period allowed for abatement); 29 U.S.C. § 662(d) (explaining writ
of mandamus procedure for employee who believes Secretary of Labor has
"arbitrarily or capriciously" failed to seek injunctive relief against an 'Imminent
danger').
250 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 to e-5(a) (2000).
251 See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. S7073 (1964) (statement of Sen. Stennis); 110
CONG. REC. S13079 (1964) (statement of Sen. Ervin).
252 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
253 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
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costs, or security. 2 54 If the employee prevails, the employer may
be ordered to pay his or her attorneys fees. 255 If an employee's
claim has no merit, the claim might still have enough "nuisance"
value to fortify the employee's demand for some settlement price.
These opportunities for private enforcement may be necessary to
level the playing field between a very large firm and an
individual employee. If the employer were a very small firm,
however, Title VII's private enforcement procedures might seem
to turn the individual employee into a Goliath.
Finally, liability for employment discrimination is different
from many other business liabilities because of the difficulty of
insuring against such liability. A simple intentional
discrimination lawsuit is excluded from coverage under a
commercial general liability ("CGL') policy precisely because it is
'Intentional" and because it does not involve the sort of bodily
injury liabilities typically covered by a CGL policy. 256 For many
years after Title VII, discrimination liability was essentially an
uninsurable risk. Recently, the insurance industry has begun to
develop a market for employment practices liability insurance
("EPLI'). 257 This new form of insurance does not necessarily
close the gap between very small firms and larger firms insofar
as their ability to absorb the costs of liability under employment
discrimination laws. Small firms are likely to experience the
usual disadvantages in purchasing insurance at competitive
rates, and it is questionable whether EPL insurers will choose to
sell policies to firms so small that they cannot afford professional
human resources or other expensive risk avoidance measures. 258
The argument that an exemption is necessary to spare small
firms from a disproportionate financial burden is undercut to
some extent by the fact that small firms are still subject to
liability for discrimination under other laws.259 Section 1981260
254 Id.
255 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
256 See Richard A. Bales & Julie McGhghy, Insuring Title VII Violations, 27 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 71, 79 (2002).
257 See Joan Gabel, et al., Evolving Conflict Between Standards for Employment
Discrimination Liability and the Delegation of That Liability: Does Employment
Practices Liability Insurance Offer Appropriate Risk Transference?, 4 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 1, 28-30 (2001).
258 See Lorelie S. Masters, Protection From the Storm: Insurance Coverage for
Employment Liability, 53 Bus. LAW. 1249, 1275-76 (1998) (demonstrating the
complexities of underwriting this type of insurance coverage).
259 Senator Javitts asserted this argument:
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prohibits race discrimination without any exemption for small
firms; executive orders require "affirmative action" by federal
contractors regardless of the number of employees; 261 and many
state discrimination laws lack exemptions or provide much more
limited exemptions. 262 None of these laws appeared likely to
overburden small firms in 1964, however, and even today they
are of little consequence in comparison with Title VII. In 1964,
the Supreme Court had not yet rendered the broad interpretation
of § 1981 that made that statute an alternative basis for an
employment discrimination claim against a private sector
employer.263 Today § 1981 prohibits a very narrow range of
discrimination in comparison with Title VII, 264 and it lacks the
employee-friendly charge processing and investigatory scheme of
Title VII. The executive orders for affirmative action are much
less intimidating than Title VII in terms of complexity or
potential liability,265 and can be avoided altogether by not doing
business with the federal government. As for the states, many
[Tihe small businessmen should be covered as well as the large
businessman-as he is in a whole string of other laws across the board. Do
we think that if he we leave him out of this provision, we will save him
from litigation with the Department of Justice, the SEC, or the other
departments? Of course not.
110 CONG. REC. S13093 (1964) (statement of Sen. Javitts).
260 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
261 See generally Exec. Order No. 10,925 (1961); Exec. Order No. 11,246, 41
C.F.R. §§ 60-1.1 to 60-999.2 (1961-1965); see also 110 CONG. REC. S13088 (1964)
(statement of Sen. Humphrey).
262 During the 1964 Congressional proceedings, several Congressmen noted that
California's discrimination law applied to employers with as few as five employees.
110 CONG. REC. S6563 (1964) (statement of Sen. Kuchel); 110 CONG. REC. S13090
(1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey). Senator Dirksen noted that some state laws
reached employers of only one employee. 110 CONG. REC. S13087 (1964) (statement
of Sen. Dirksen); see also 110 CONG. REC. S6548 (1964) (statement of Sen.
Humphrey).
263 It was not until 1968 that the Court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1866
does not require proof of state action. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,
421-22 (1968).
264 For example, § 1981 prohibits only intentional race discrimination and
possibly national origin discrimination. See St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481
U.S. 604, 613 (1987). It does not prohibit discrimination on any other basis, and it
does not prohibit disparate impact race discrimination. See Gen. Bldg. Contractors
Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 388-91 (1982).
265 There is no private enforcement of employee rights under the executive
orders. Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1083 (5th Cir. 1980). If a contractor
violates its obligations, it might be barred from doing business with the federal
government, but the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs is likely to use
the threat of this sanction mainly as leverage to encourage reform. Id.
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did not prohibit discrimination in 1964.266 Today nearly every
state prohibits discrimination, but usually with a small firm
exemption modeled after Title VII.267 State laws that lack an
exemption are sometimes accompanied by administrative dispute
resolution and limited liability for employers. 268
There is one more fact-a development since 1964-that
might undercut the need for regulatory relief for small firms
today. Since 1964, the staffing service industry has developed a
number of models for providing professional human resources
services for small businesses. One model involves the transfer of
some or all the small business' employees to the staffing service's
payroll, making the staffing service the nominal "employer" of
the employees. The contract employer (the workers' original
employer) then 'leases" the employees from the staffing service,
to do exactly the same work as before. The leasing of employees
can make it easier to secure insurance and benefits for the
employees, and it can also be one way of providing professional
human resources management for the workforce, provided such
services are part of the arrangement. Whether such services are
equally available to, or practical for, a small firm as for a large
firm, and whether they significantly reduce or eliminate a small
firm's problems in matching a larger firm's economies of scale is
unclear. A survey by the American Staffing Association shows
that small firms are less likely than larger firms to rely on
staffing services. While twenty-four percent of firms employing
more than 100 employees engaged staffing services, only twelve
percent of firms employing twenty-five to ninety-nine employees
266 See 110 CONG. REC. S13080 (1964) (statement of Sen. Clark).
267 See Griffin v. Eller, 922 P.2d 788, 791 (Wash. 1996) (citing RONALD M.
GREEN ET AL., STATE BY STATE GUIDE TO HUMAN RESOURCES LAW 22-24 (1990))
(describing a survey of state laws). The states that provide small firm exemptions
have reached conflicting conclusions with regard to whether there is a common law
or public policy-based wrongful discharge cause of action based on discrimination.
Compare Roberts v. Dudley, 993 P.2d 901, 911 (Wash. 2000) (finding a small
employer liable for wrongful discharge based on a public policy against
discrimination), with Jennings v. Marralle, 876 P.2d 1074, 1082-83 (Cal. 1994)
(holding that a statutory small firm exemption preempts a common law cause of
action against exempt employer) and Burton v. Exam Center Indus. & Gen. Med.
Clinic, Inc., 994 P.2d 1261, 1266-67 (Utah 2000) (declining to find a discrimination
action in tort for small employers).
268 Wisconsin law, for example, has no small firm exemption. A person could be
an employer by virtue of the employment of a single employee. WIS. STAT.
§ 111.32(6)(a) (2002). Wisconsin's law, however, provides for administrative dispute
resolution with limited financial liability for the employer. Id. §§ 111.39(4)(b)-(c).
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engaged staffing services. 269 Most firms that engaged staffing
services did so to obtain 'temporary" help, to provide temporary
substitution for regular employees on leave, or to perform special
short-term projects. As of 2005, employee leasing or other
"contract" worker arrangements appear to have reached a very
limited number of firms and workers. 270 In sum, it does not
appear that staffing services have been a significant factor in
closing the gap between large and small firms.
2. Is the Single Employer Doctrine Consistent with the Goal of
Regulatory Relief for Small Firms?
In Papa, Judge Posner argued that the single employer
doctrine is inconsistent with the small firm exemption's purpose
of protecting small firms from the disproportionate burden of
regulation. 271 He began his argument with a premise that the
regulatory relief purpose of the exemption is unrelated to the
wealth of a firm's owner: 'If a firm is too small to be able
economically to cope with the antidiscrimination laws, the owner
will not keep it afloat merely because he is rich; rich people aren't
famous for wanting to throw good money after bad.'2 72 Next, he
argued that intercorporate ownership and integration of
operations, management, or personnel relation are no more
relevant to the small firm exemption than the wealth of the
owner. 273  Intercorporate integration, standing alone, reveals
nothing about a firm's need for an exemption, according to Judge
Posner, because it is a perfectly normal way of doing business, as
much for very small firms as for larger ones.274 A small firm
must integrate at least some functions with other firms by some
means in order to achieve economies of scale necessary to
compete, particularly against larger firms. When a small firm
integrates by affiliating with another firm, such as by one firm's
269 STEVEN P. BERCHEM, AMERICAN STAFFING ASS'N, AMERICAN STAFFING
ASSOCIATION'S ANNUAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE STAFFING INDUSTRY (2005),
available at http://www.americanstaffing.net/statistics/economic2005.cfm.
270 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CONTINGENT AND ALTERNATIVE
EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS (2005), available at http://ftp.bls.gov/pub
/news.release/conemp.txt (reporting that in 2005 between 1.8 to 4.1 percent of total
employees were "contingent workers').
271 For a discussion of the facts and issues in Papa, see supra text accompanying
notes 53-96.
272 Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir. 1999).
273 Id. at 942.
274 Id.
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acquisition of another, it is simply adopting one of at least two
different strategies for integration. The small firm could also
integrate by making a contract for certain services with an
independently owned firm that performs the same service for
many other firms.
Indeed, a small firm can achieve economies of scale by either
means of integration-affiliation or contract-for nearly any
business function. Consider, for example, the integration of
personnel management (including payroll and benefits
administration). If the firm owns, is owned by, or shares a
common owner with another firm, the combined enterprise can
employ one full time payroll and benefits administrator to service
both firms, splitting the cost between the firms. Alternatively,
the small firm could contract with an unaffiliated payroll and
benefits servicing agency that serves many different firms, at a
fraction of the cost of hiring staff to provide the same services in-
house.
In Judge Posner's view, the single employer doctrine ascribes
undue importance to a firm's choice of methods for integration.
Under most applications of the doctrine in discrimination law,
common ownership or some other means of common financial
control is a prerequisite for treating two firms as one employer.
Naturally, commonly owned firms are more likely to integrate
administration and operations with their affiliates, rather than
by contracting. Judge Posner argued, however, that a small
firm's integration by one means rather than the other has little
or no bearing on its need for regulatory relief. "Why should it
make a difference," he queried, 'if the integration takes the
[contract] form instead of common ownership, so that the tiny
employer gets his pension plan, his legal and financial advice,
and his payroll function from his parent corporation without
contractual formalities, rather than from independent
contractors? ' 75 Finding no reason, Judge Posner concluded that
the means of integration should make no difference at all. In his
view, the fact that the employer-subsidiaries in Papa merged
payroll administration and benefits plans with their parents and
affiliated subsidiaries was simply irrelevant to whether they
qualified as small firms exempt from the reach of employment
discrimination laws.
275 Id. (emphasis added).
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The difficulty with this reasoning is that if it were
categorically true, the small firm exemption would serve no
practical function at all, except to create an arbitrary and
irrational distinction between small corporations on the one
hand, and small divisions of corporations on the other. To
restate Judge Posner's query, why should it make a difference if
firms integrated by affiliation or contracting remain separately
incorporated, rather than merging? If it is true that contracting
or integration achieve the same economies of scale, then an
enterprise is in the same boat whether it is independently owned,
separately incorporated but affiliated, or an unincorporated part
of a larger corporation. And this would mean that Congress'
belief that small firms need relief is simply wrong. Congress
should have followed the lead of those states that deny
preferential treatment to small firms.
Judge Posner's argument that the means of integration of
personnel administration is not a meaningful basis for distinction
is best directed at one arguable overuse of the single employer
doctrine: piercing the corporate veil for purposes of holding a
corporation liable for the actions of a separately incorporated
affiliate. It is, of course, widely accepted that good faith
incorporation is a legitimate means of limiting an owner's
liability.276 The rule limiting liability promotes investment as
much for small firms as for large ones. Since integration by one
means or another is normal for any business, the mere fact that
integration occurs between a parent corporation and its
subsidiary is not, standing alone, a persuasive reason to pierce
the corporate veil, and there does not appear to be any reason
why liability for discrimination should be any more penetrating
than liability for any other reason. In Papa, however, the precise
issue on appeal was whether the affiliates should be treated as
one "employer" for purposes of coverage.277 True, the EEOC has
adopted the NLRB's view that application of the single employer
doctrine is the equivalent of piercing the corporate veil for
purposes of liability,278 but piercing the corporate veil raises
276 See generally John A. Swain & Edwin E. Aguilar, Piercing the Veil To Assert
Personal Jurisdiction over Corporate Affiliates: An Empirical Study of the Cannon
Doctrine, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 445, 446, 450-51 (2004) (introducing basic policy
considerations of limiting shareholder liability).
277 Papa, 166 F.3d at 939.
278 See supra text accompanying note 49.
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entirely different issues from the problem of coverage. A finding
that a small subsidiary should not be treated as an exempt small
firm would not lead ineluctably to a finding that the entire
corporate family was jointly liable. Still, the arguments of critics
like Judge Posner might best be understood as an anticipatory
response to the possibility that plaintiffs, having obtained
coverage over a subsidiary, will then hold the parent financially
liable.
The real issue for cases like Papa, however, is whether
separately incorporated entities that are closely affiliated and
integrated with larger enterprises should be granted the same
exemption allowed to truly small and independent firms. In this
regard, there are important limits to Judge Posner's argument.
First, independent firms might not be able to gain the same
efficiencies of scale by contract that affiliated firms gain by
integration. As noted earlier, the staff services industry provides
personnel administration on a contract basis for many firms, but
very small firms do not seem to have used these services as
effectively as larger firms.279 Since very small firms tend to be
the least stable and pay the lowest wages and provide the least
benefits, it is doubtful that they are attractive clients for the
staffing services industry. If so, a firm that affiliates and
integrates with a larger enterprise is at a comparative
advantage, whether the enterprise provides personnel services
internally or contracts for such services on behalf of all its
subsidiaries.
Second, the economies of scale that contracting might
provide for ongoing personnel functions such as payroll and
benefits administration might not apply to the regulatory costs of
discrimination law. Some of the principal costs of discrimination
law are training and review of supervisors, developing an
ongoing awareness of the law, and promoting a culture of
nondiscrimination. If the firm is a subsidiary within a larger
enterprise, it can combine training of managers from all affiliated
organizations to achieve economies of scale that cannot be
obtained by the independent firm's contracting with outside
providers. Moreover, an integrated enterprise enjoys the
advantage of informal sharing of information and the culture of
diversity among affiliated managers, particularly when there is
279 See supra text accompanying notes 269-270.
20061 1259
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
overlapping management, in ways that cannot be achieved by
contracting. Other potential costs of discrimination law are
defense and liability. As noted earlier, these costs might actually
be the most important disproportionate burdens small firms
would face if not for the small firm exemption, 280 but small firms
might not be able to insure against these costs. 281
Third, Judge Posner was replying mainly to one part of the
single employer test, the integration of labor management, which
he deemed irrelevant. His attention to this particular factor is
not surprising, because the EEOC and the courts have tended to
assign particular importance to this factor. Judge Posner,
however, may be correct that the importance of integrated labor
management is overplayed in discrimination cases. The NLRB
has emphasized integrated labor management as a factor in
bargaining unit cases, and in discretionary jurisdiction cases in
which the ultimate question is the effect of a labor dispute on
commerce. In discrimination law, however, the question is how
to aim the small firm exemption at firms that operate at such a
disadvantage in general that they may need relief from
government regulation. Even if independent small firms are able
to contract for personnel services that affiliated firms gain by
integration, there are still many reasons why independent firms
might be at a disadvantage. Small independent firms might not
be able to gain competitive economies of scale with respect to the
integration of other services and operations beyond personnel
administration. Moreover, small firms often remain independent
even when profits are relatively low because the owner seeks and
perhaps needs the independence and security of self-
employment. 2 2
Finally, Judge Posner's initial premise, that the character of
the business owner (wealthy or not wealthy) is irrelevant, 2 3 may
be a bit off the mark. At least as a matter of rhetoric, Congress'
debates about the small firm were particularly about the
individual whose business is his or her self-employment or the
employment for his or her family. The image of a self-employed
280 See supra text accompanying notes 243-254.
281 See supra text accompanying notes 256-258.
282 For a discussion of personality traits of the self-employed, including their
greater emphasis on independence, see Sjoerd Beugelsdijk & Niels Noorderhaven,
Personality Characteristics of Self-Employed: An Empirical Study, 24 SMALL Bus.
ECON. 159, 164-66 (2005).
283 Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir. 1999).
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business owner seems clear enough from the tenor of the
congressional debates about the burden of regulation on the
small business owner. 284 It becomes even clearer in the next
section about one of Congress' other purposes: to protect truly
'personal" relationships.
B. A Right of "Personal" Relationships
A second goal articulated by congressional proponents of the
small firm exemption was to secure a limited sphere for a right of
personal relationships, free from government interference. 28 5
Even the boldest proposals for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did
not include regulation of intimate relations, such as marriage,
family, friendship and purely social relations. There was intense
conflict, however, at several points along the uncertain border
between 'business" and "personal." Provisions of the Act directed
at public accommodations, for example, provoked the 'Mrs.
Murphy" debate: If 'Mrs. Murphy" sought to make a little money
by offering the extra room in her home to a boarder, should the
government tell her whom she must invite?28 6
The business versus personal argument extended to Title VII
of the Act. There was evidently no dispute that some working
relationships such as partnership were personal even if they
were for a business purpose, and that these relationships must
remain outside the reach of the law. Advocates of the small firm
exemption argued, however, that some employer-employee
relations were also personal, and that the law should protect the
most personal employment relations by distinguishing between
large, bureaucratic workplaces and small, intimate ones. Within
284 A test based on the number of employees does not precisely match the
rhetoric, but it is hard to imagine a more effective definition of "small" for this
purpose. As noted earlier, the only other simple and widely accepted means of
measuring firm size is by revenue, but this method has its own problems and might
defeat the purpose of discrimination law in some important respects. See supra Part
IV.A.1. One could also envision a test based on the number of a firm's individual
owners to distinguish 'investment" from self-employment, but such a test would
then have to account for the fact that families sometimes act like individuals,
depending on lines of authority and loyalty within the particular family.
285 The idea of zone of freedom to discriminate in 'personal" relations within
very small firms was also a purpose of some of the state laws that preceded Title VII.
See Jennings v. Marralle, 876 P.2d 1074, 1081-82 (Cal. 1994); Tobriner, supra note
194, at 342 (describing the purposes of California's exemption for firms employing
fewer than five employees).
286 110 CONG. REC. S6534 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
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a small firm, the argument ran, relations between owners,
managers and their employees were like partnerships or other
personal associations. These relations were not a proper
subject of government regulation. 28 7  'JW]hen a small
businessman.., selects an employee," Senator Cotton reasoned,
'he comes very close to selecting a partner; and when [he] selects
a partner, he comes dangerously close to the situation he faces
when he selects a wife."288  Senator Cotton conceded that
discrimination within the small firm was no less immoral than
within the large firm. 28 9 Nevertheless, he relied partly on the
"personal relations" argument in the course of proposing an
unsuccessful amendment to raise the threshold for employer
coverage to 100 employees. 290
Proponents of broader coverage conceded that relations in
the very small workplace might indeed be so personal as to
warrant immunity from the law, but they disagreed that the
threshold should be any higher. Senator Humphrey, one of the
Act's leading advocates, argued that if an employer's workforce
reached twenty-five employees, it would 'lose most of whatever
intimate, personal character they might have had."2 91 Senator
Clark, another proponent of the Act, believed that personal
relations would be adequately protected by a threshold of five or
even fewer employees. 292 In the end, he agreed to the twenty-five
employee threshold not because a workplace of such size
warranted protection for personal relations, but because 'tw]e
must admit that in terms of appropriation and enforcement there
are limits" to the scope of employer coverage. 293
Of course, there is no particular workplace population at
which relations cease to be "personal" and become 'Impersonal."
Relations in very large workplaces can be very intimate between
some pairs or groups of individuals, and relations between an
individual owner/manager and his sole employee can be distant
and cold. Assuming that a headcount of employees is still the
best test of potentially personal workplace relations, should
287 110 CONG. REC. S7074 (1964) (statements of Sen. Long and Sen. Stennis).
288 110 CONG. REC. S13085 (1964) (statement of Sen. Cotton).
289 110 CONG. REC. S13091 (1964) (statement of Sen. Cotton).
290 110 CONG. REC. S13085 (1964) (statement of Sen. Cotton); 110 CONG. REC.
S13093 (1964).
291 110 CONG. REC. S13088 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
292 110 CONG. REC. S13089 (1964) (statement of Sen. Clark).
293 Id.
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personal relations be free from the prohibition against
discrimination? Most of the reported congressional commentary
on the issue proceeded from an assumption that it is self-evident
that the law should not interfere in personal relations, if only it
were possible to draft a law to make the appropriate distinctions.
But advocates for immunity for personal relations in 1964
frequently made the argument apologetically-they did not mean
to suggest that discrimination in employment is ever moral-and
over the years the personal relations justification has seemed to
fade from memory. Many critiques of the small firm exemption
omit any mention of the personal relations argument, as if it had
never been sincerely or persuasively advanced.
Still, there are reasons to be more protective of personal
relations within a small firm than within a large firm. Title VII
affects personal relations within the firm in two different ways.
First, the enforcement process and remedies that go along with
Title VII and other discrimination laws can be disruptive of
personal relations within the firm, and more so in small firms
than in large ones. When a disappointed applicant or employee
charges or sues a small firm for employment discrimination, the
resulting litigation can have consequences beyond the cost of
defense or financial liability. Until the claim is resolved, the
right to at least one job is uncertain. If the claimant prevails on
the issue of discrimination, he or she might seek reinstatement
at the expense of the 'Innocent incumbent" employee.294 If a firm
employing twenty is sued for discrimination in hiring, the
litigation affects at least five percent of its workforce. The
smaller the firm, the larger the impact. If a current employee
files an administrative charge with the EEOC while remaining
employed, relations between the employee and the accused
owner/manager are likely to be frosty-as evidenced by the large
number of "retaliation" charges that follow discrimination
charges. 295 For a large firm, the effect of difficult relations on
294 See generally Larry M. Parsons, Note, Title WI Remedies: Reinstatement and
the Innocent Incumbent Employee, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1441 (1989) (examining the
propriety of ordering immediate reinstatement to a victim of discrimination under
Title VII when that relief requires the displacement of an innocent incumbent
employee). An order for the employment or reinstatement of a prevailing plaintiff
does not require the employer to discharge the employer's preferred candidate, but it
is unlikely, especially in a small firm, that the employer can continue to employ both
individuals.
295 Retaliation cases constitute more than a third of the suits filed by the EEOC
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productivity can be diluted by the size of the workforce or by
transfers. For a small firm, the tension between one employee
and the owner/manager could become an overwhelming
distraction.
A second and more direct way that discrimination law affects
personal relations within the small firm is by prohibiting the
owner/manager's prejudices for particular types of employees,
particularly prejudices that are illegal under the law. It may
seem preposterous that the exemption was designed to permit
small firms the very evil the law was designed to eradicate. 296
Even supporters of the exemption in 1964 stopped short of an
explicit defense of discrimination by small firms. Nevertheless,
the effect of the exemption is to permit small firms to
discriminate, unless they are subject to state or local anti-
discrimination laws. Thus, for better or worse, the small firm
exemption serves as a refuge for the incurably color-conscious.
In fact, it should neither be surprising nor very troubling if
owner/managers of very small firms are allowed to be affected by
conscious or subconscious biases or engage in the sort of
discrimination that is illegal when practiced by larger firms.
Self-employment and ownership of small business provides
employment and opportunity for many persons who find it
difficult to work for others or to conform to rules established by
others. Self-employment may also be the best outlet for persons
who cannot conform or who are unwilling to conform to some of
the rules of discrimination law. Moreover, if a small firm owner's
biases are susceptible to proof because of past incidents or
allegations, he or she may be unemployable as a manager or
supervisor in a nonexempt firm, because his or her record of
possible bias would be evidence of discrimination in any
challenged employment decision in which he or she was involved.
If self-employment is the most productive option for such
individuals, a license to discriminate in the selection of a small
number of employees may be a necessary corollary.
against employers from 2002 through 2005. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, FY 2005 ANN. REP. ON THE OPERATIONS & ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE
OFF. OF THE GEN. COUNS. pt. III(C), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/litigation
/05annrpt/index.html.
296 Several state courts have interpreted their own laws, modeled after Title VII
and the small firm exemption, to preempt a public policy-based common law
prohibition against discrimination. See supra notes 10, 267.
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Granting such a license is not a trivial matter. As noted at
the outset, small firms employ millions of workers, and the
impact of their discrimination could be significant, particularly in
small towns and labor markets where small firms predominate.
Fortunately, there are some limits on this impact. The very
worst forms of discrimination, such as rank sexual or racial
harassment, are still subject to tort law. A small business owner
whose harassment of an employee is "outrageous" might be
exempt from an EEOC charge but could still find himself liable
for the tort of outrage297 and possibly for assault or battery.
Moreover, the impact of the small firm license to discriminate
may be diminished by the fact that not all small business owners
feel the same biases. To some extent, their biases will be
opposite and offsetting. Minority firms, for example, tend to
employ a disproportionately large number of minority workers. 298
In fact, the idea that discrimination by small firms could actually
benefit minorities was a third argument advanced by promoters
of the small firm exemption in 1964, and this idea is explored in
greater detail in the next section of this article.
If protection of personal relationships is a purpose of the
small firm exemption, then the single employer doctrine is
consistent with that purpose. A small firm owned by an
individual or family more nearly matches Congress' intent than a
firm that is affiliated with, and perhaps completely owned by a
larger enterprise, particularly if the small firm's separate
incorporation is for business reasons unrelated to personal
relationships within its workforce. When the firm is part of a
larger family of corporations, its existence is unlikely to be tied to
a particular individual, and affiliation with the larger enterprise
provides more options for dealing with a dispute over the right to
a particular job or the tension resulting from a discrimination
charge. For example, centralization of power within an
enterprise allows for the possibility of intercorporate
reassignments and transfers.
C. Racial and Ethnic Self-Help: Discrimination by Minority-
Owned Small Firms
Senator Cotton, a defender of the small firm exemption and
297 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
298 THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY, supra note 241, at 60-61, 87-88.
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proponent for an even wider exemption, explained a third reason
for the small firm exemption:
If I were a Negro, and by dint of education, training, and hard
work I had amassed enough property as a Negro so that I had a
business of my own,. . . [if] I wanted to help people of may own
race to step up as I had stepped up, I think I should have the
right to do so .... [I] do not believe that anyone in Washington
should be permitted to come in and say, 'ly]ou cannot employ all
Negroes. You must have some Poles. You must have some
Yankees. " 2 99
It is tempting to dismiss Senator Cotton's plea for ethnic or
racial self-help as disingenuous. The right of small business
owners to promote their own race did little for the African-
American community before Title VII because discrimination,
including a great deal of self-help by non-minority businesses,
had severely limited minority entrepreneurship. Perhaps
Senator Cotton envisioned a day when laws against
discrimination would permit minority entrepreneurship to
flourish, and a small firm exemption would serve as a kind of
self-affirmative action for the first wave of minority
entrepreneurs to spread the seeds of their success within their
own communities. Even today, however, African-Americans as a
class lag behind White Americans in self-employment or small
firm ownership. 300 Minority-owned small firms do tend to hire
more employees of the same minority,30 1 but 'lawful"
discrimination is not necessarily the reason. Minority-owned
businesses might hire more minorities simply because they are
located in racial or ethnic enclaves.
The best support for the racial or ethnic self-help argument
comes from the experience of some immigrant communities,
where small businesses have created employment opportunities
and provided a community-wide economic lift.302 Some measure
of immigrant success might depend on intentional
discrimination. For example, a family of immigrants might
299 110 CONG. REC. S 13086 (June 9, 1964) (statement of Sen. Cotton); see also
110 CONG. REC. S13086 (June 9, 1964) (statement of Sen. Curtis). Senator Fannin
raised a similar argument during the debate preceding the 1972 amendments. 118
CONG. REC. S2409-10 (1972) (statement of Sen. Fannin); see also 118 CONG. REC.
S3171 (1972) (statement of Sen. Ervin).
300 THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY, supra note 241, at 60-61, 87-89.
301 Id.
302 Id. at 87-88.
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prefer to hire its own members, relatives, or friends to work in
the restaurant, shop, or motel it owns. The family might also
share resources and information with or grant preferences to
other businesses within a network of families of the same
ethnicity. 30 3 Such favoritism could be illegal ' ational origin" or
' ace" discrimination by a covered employer, 30 4 but the small firm
exemption protects the small family-owned business from the
duties of nondiscrimination. Over time, the business might
become more successful and graduate to the rank of "covered"
employer.
The single employer doctrine is entirely consistent with a
legislative intention to permit minority self-help within very
small firms. The effect of the doctrine is to limit the right of self-
help to the sorts of individually or family-owned firms that the
proponents of the exemption appear to have had in mind. Even
the strongest proponents of the exemption and self-help do not
appear to have intended to permit minority self-help by firms
closely affiliated with larger enterprises and not necessarily
associated with a particular individual or family. Otherwise, a
very large enterprise composed of many separately incorporated
restaurants, motels, retail establishments, or other small-scale
establishments might continue to engage in lawful
discrimination that might eventually defeat Title VII's goal of
racial and ethnic integration.
D. Avoiding Over-Extension of the EEOC's Resources
A fourth argument for the small firm exemption was that the
EEOC's projected budget would not support unlimited
jurisdiction over all employers. 3 5 Questions about the likely size
and budget for an EEOC and its capacity to tackle the formidable
problem of employment discrimination were frequent topics in
the congressional debate. Past experience was sobering. Lack of
administrative resources had undermined efforts to enforce
executive orders against discrimination by federal contractors. 30 6
303 Id.
304 See, e.g., Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 697 F.2d 1297, 1298-99, 1302
(9th Cir. 1982) (finding a prima facie violation of Title VII where an employer gave
better jobs, pay, hours, and shareholder rights to persons of Italian ancestry or
family or friends of current shareholders).
305 See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. S13091 (1964) (statement of Sen. Cotton).
306 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, supra note 34, at 1-3.
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Senator Cotton warned that if Title VII applied to all employers,
large and small, it would require a "small army" for
enforcement. 3 7  Fiscal support for an "army" of federal
bureaucrats was unlikely, and a smaller number of bureaucrats
would be overwhelmed by their task. "If it became necessary...
to investigate every complaint. . . " Senator Cotton argued,
"enforcement would become well nigh impossible; and the
enforcement which did occur would be found to be spotty.'308 The
solution was to approve an agency of limited size and mandate to
target cases yielding the greatest impact and the greatest
number of employment opportunities for minorities.
The small firm exemption was not really necessary for this
strategy. Congress might have let the EEOC follow the example
of the NLRB, which had adopted self-tailored jurisdictional limits
to better manage its administrative resources. 309 The extent of
the small firm exemption, or perhaps a series of exemptions
tailored to particular businesses, might then have evolved
according to the EEOC's actual experience and resources. But
whether or not a statutory limitation of coverage was necessary,
the leading supporters of Title VII used the small firm exemption
to assure Congress that the law would not require a bureaucratic
behemoth, that the agency's projected budget was sufficient, and
that the EEOC would spend its efforts efficiently. 310 Senator
Clark, who had favored a much smaller exemption, explained his
agreement to the twenty-five employee threshold as the product
of a realistic appraisal of resources available for enforcement. 311
A small firm exemption for employers with fewer than twenty-
five employees became one basis for Senator Humphrey's
estimates of the EEOC's responsibilities and needs.312
307 110 CONG. REC. S13086 (1964) (statement of Sen. Cotton).
308 110 CONG. REC. S13085 (1964) (statement of Sen. Cotton); see also Griffin v.
Eller, 922 P.2d 788, 791-92 (Wash. 1996) (upholding statutory small-firm exemption
under rational basis review by speculating that the legislature could have intended
to "conserv[e] limited state resources" and "to avoido the regulatory burden inherent
in regulation by the Human Rights Commission').
309 See supra text accompanying notes 146-156.
310 See 110 CONG. REC. S13081 (1964) (statements of Sens. Clark and Chase).
311 110 CONG. REC. S13089 (1964) (statement of Sen. Clark); see also 110 CONG.
REC. S13087 (1964) (statement of Sen. Dirksen).
312 110 CONG. REC. S13088 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey). Relying on
employer registrations with the Social Security Administration, Senator Humphrey
counted three million employers above the threshold for coverage. He believed these
three million constituted eight percent of all employers, and that they employed
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The single employer doctrine expands coverage and thus
increases the number of cases the EEOC must process, but the
EEOC endorses the single employer doctrine as part of the rules
of coverage. That might be answer enough to the question
whether the doctrine is consistent with conservation of the
EEOC's resources. The four-factor version of the doctrine recited
in the EEOC's regulations is sufficiently vague to permit the
EEOC a fair amount of latitude for applying the doctrine
according to the demands on agency resources. Moreover, the
enforcement process that has evolved since 1964 depends more
on private enforcement than the drafters of Title VII might have
foreseen. If the EEOC is stymied, individual plaintiffs are still
free to pursue enforcement by a private lawsuit.
E. The Small Firm Exemption as a Political Compromise
A realistic appraisal of the original legislative purpose of the
small employer exemption deserves the usual caveat for politics.
Many of the Congressmen who worried for small firms or who
favored a wider small firm exemption represented the Old South
and segregation. They were not seeking to make the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 a better law. They were hoping to defeat it.313 The
record of congressional debate over the exemption is unusually
rich because the Act's opponents filibustered and filled the record
with many arguments designed as much to fill time as to win
votes.314 On the other hand, the Act's supporters were not
insensitive to the arguments listed above, and they did not
oppose a small firm exemption in principle. They simply resisted
forty percent of all employees. Id.
313 Opponents of Title VII were of two minds about the exemption. While most
opponents of Title VII appear to have supported the exemption as a way of diluting a
law that might be inevitable, some appeared to oppose the exemption as a kind of
dare, arguing that anything less than complete coverage was morally inconsistent.
Senator Stennis of Mississippi argued during the 1972 debate, 'If a principle is
involved here, if it is a right that these employees have, why exempt those who
employ less than eight? .... If someone has only two employees, if a principle is
involved, this bill ought to cover it." 118 CONG. REC. S2490 (1972) (statement of Sen.
Stennis).
314 See 110 CONG. REC. S7069-92 (1964) (documenting Sen. Stennis' opposition
to expedited deliberation and recording various arguments against the Act); see also
110 CONG. REC. S7202 (1964) (statement of Sen. Clark). Filibusters had defeated
earlier attempts at civil rights legislation. On this occasion, the Senate did not
approve the final version of the Civil Rights Act, including Title VII, until after 534
hours of debate. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI, supra note 34, at 8, 11.
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an exemption any wider then necessary to gain the Act's
passage. 315
Politics best explains the decision to set the threshold for
coverage at any particular level. Only the explanation of the
exemption as a device to match the EEOC's mandate with its
means arguably points decisively to a threshold of twenty-five
employees in 1964 or fifteen in 1972, rather than any of the other
thresholds proposed in Congress or adopted in various state civil
rights laws.316 Still, there is little in the record to suggest a
studied effort to arrive at precisely the right threshold, other
than to find the threshold leaving enough small business owners
outside the Act's coverage to make the new law palatable. 317 In
this regard, Congress was simply following a road to compromise
already successfully charted by several state legislatures. 318
Senator Javitts defended the twenty-five-employee threshold as
part of a web of compromises that marked "the very thin edge of
agreement.'" 19 Senator Dirksen made the same argument in
opposition to efforts to raise the threshold higher.320
The single employer doctrine is more consistent with this
compromise than a rule of coverage without the doctrine. The
rhetoric of the congressional debate presented the exemption as
315 See 110 CONG. REC. S6549 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); 110 CONG.
REC. S6563 (1964) (statement of Sen. Kuchel); 110 CONG. REC. S7218 (1964)
(statement of Sen. Clark); 110 CONG. REC. S13081 (1964) (statement of Sen. Clark);
110 CONG. REC. S13083 (1964); 110 CONG. REC. S13087 (1964) (statement of Sen.
Dirksen); 110 CONG. REC. S13090-91 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
316 See Crandley, supra note 63, at 1056-57 (describing the different thresholds
states had adopted for coverage under their civil rights laws). Proponents for wider
Title VII coverage sought to reduce the threshold from twenty-five to eight
employees in 1972. See 118 CONG. REC. 2390-96 (1972); H.R. Rep. No. 92-238 (1971)
92d Cong., (2d Sess. 1972), 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137. They settled, however, on a
reduction to fifteen, which remains the current threshold. Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1972)).
317 See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. S13092 (1964) (statement of Sen. Cotton) (warning
of political backlash if small businesses were subject to the law).
318 In 1963, four years after California adopted its Fair Employment Practices
Act, the Counsel for the California Fair Employment Commission summarized the
purposes of California's small firm exemption. One reason he listed was to avoid
"political repercussions" if individuals were not allowed 'to retain some small
measure of the so-called freedom to discriminate." A second was that the 'framers"
of the California law believed 'they could afford to exempt the small employer" in
order to obtain a law targeting the most important employers. Tobriner, supra note
194, at 342 (1965).
319 110 CONG. REC. S13093 (1964) (statement of Sen. Javitts).
320 110 CONG. REC. S13087 (1964) (statement of Sen. Dirksen).
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protection for small, individually and family-owned businesses,
not subsidiaries of multi-corporate enterprises. Moreover, there
is some evidence that those who argued in favor of the exemption
were aware of the single employer doctrine in other contexts. 321
V. CONCLUSION: WHAT KIND OF SINGLE EMPLOYER DOCTRINE
BEST SERVES TITLE VIIS PURPOSES?
Tradition, statutory text, and congressional intent appear to
support the single employer doctrine, at least for matters of
employer coverage under Title VII and the other major federal
employment discrimination laws. What form should the doctrine
take for this purpose? Must it necessarily follow the same four-
factor test applied by the NLRB in collective bargaining cases?
And what of the doctrine's suitability for other purposes under
discrimination law, such as treating affiliated corporations as one
"respondent" for administrative purposes, applying the right
ceiling for compensatory and punitive damages, 322 or piercing the
corporate veil to make a corporate parent or affiliate liable for
the actions of a subsidiary? Is the test of single employer status
necessarily the same for every purpose? Obviously, a conclusion
that the single employer doctrine is part of the law of Title VII is
only the starting point leading to many other issues. Here are at
least a few thoughts about the doctrine's use and mechanics in
cases of employment discrimination.
First, it may be important to distinguish the doctrine's
different functions, particularly its function as a rule of coverage
versus its function as a rule of liability. Nearly all the cases in
which courts accepted the doctrine involved issues of coverage,
not liability. To hold that a corporation is covered by Title VII is
one thing. To say that a judgment against one subsidiary is good
against affiliate and parent corporations is another.323  The
failure to distinguish these two different functions may explain
some of the recent resistance to the single employer doctrine. In
321 See supra text accompanying note 197.
322 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (1991).
323 The question whether the single employer doctrine pierces the corporate veil
gained new importance in 1991 when Congress provided for compensatory and
punitive damage awards in discrimination cases and limited such awards according
to the number of a respondent's employees. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, Title I, § 102, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (1991)). The
question of piercing has also been particularly important in cases under the WARN
Act, where the nominal employer is typically in some financial distress.
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Papa, for example, the issue was coverage, but Judge Posner
rejected the single employer doctrine and offered a substitute:
the traditional grounds for piercing the corporate veil for
purposes of liability. 324 True, much (but not all) of the history
and analysis supporting the doctrine as a rule of coverage might
also support the doctrine for purposes of liability, but the test for
single employer status might nevertheless be different for each
function. These are issues for another day.
Second, the four-factor test that evolved for multiple
functions in the law of collective bargaining is not necessarily
appropriate for distinguishing truly small firms built on personal
relationships and needing regulatory relief, from those that are
part of a larger enterprise. Common ownership, especially
complete common ownership, may be the most important factor
for purposes of entitlement to the small firm exemption. On the
other hand, Judge Posner may be correct that the usual four-
factor test places undue weight on a firm's method of integrating
its administration and operations with the affiliates. Whether a
firm integrates any particular part of its business by contract or
affiliation may say little about its need for relief with respect to
the particular burdens imposed by employment discrimination
law. Consider, for example, three separately incorporated
restaurants owned by a single individual. Like many small
businesses, the restaurants may have relatively little occasion to
exhibit 'Integrated" personnel relations, and any single
restaurant could operate independently of the others. On the
other hand, the owner might now indirectly employ as many as
forty-two individuals in three allegedly exempt establishments in
an industry with relatively high turnover. Such an enterprise is
not likely to be based on personal relationships. For example,
the owner does enjoy some economies of scale in learning the law.
What he learns in his role as manager of one restaurant is
equally useful in his role in another. Common ownership also
creates the potential for exploiting the advantages of a large
workforce, such as the ability to transfer workers from one
establishment or division to another.
Finally, the single employer doctrine is often criticized for
leading adversaries into a painstaking and seemingly pointless
examination of the details of interrelated businesses, such as the
324 See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
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sharing of common business forms, geographic proximity,
common phone lines, and specific business transactions together.
Much of this attention to details stems from the traditional
importance attached to integration of operations and personnel
administration. A test properly adapted to the purposes of the
single employer doctrine would begin with common ownership,
and would assign a strong presumption in favor of single
employer status in the case of complete or substantially complete
common ownership. The burden would then shift to the common
owner of the enterprise to prove that separately organized
affiliates were particularly associated with individuals or
personal relationships, or that there are circumstances
preventing the affiliates from dealing with the burdens of
employment discrimination regulation in the same manner as
other large enterprises.
Such a test might alter the outcome in many cases. Firms
with less than complete common ownership but sufficient
integration to qualify under the four-factor test might not qualify
as a single employer under this revised test. Firms with
complete ownership but little integration would not likely be a
single employer under the traditional four-factor test, but they
might under a revised test. The result would more certainly
vindicate the real goals of the small firm exemption.
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